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THE SHATTERED DREAM OF AMERICAN
HOUSING POLICY - THE NEED FOR REFORMt*
MICHAEL H. HOEFLICH"
ROBIN PAUL. MALLOY *"
For a quarter century, home ownership has been an integral part of the American
dream. A vast subsidy machinery has been built upon t he apparently simple premise that
every citizen ought to own a home of his or her own. Unfortunately, during the past
decade the reality of high interest rates, rising construction costs, and the dismantling of
our antiquated, over-regulated banking system has shattered this dream for most. Amer-
icans.' The average house is now too costly for the average American family.' In urban
areas in particular, the post-war generation is discovering that it must settle for rental
accommodations. In light of these changes, it is crucial to rethink housing policy and
evaluate the wisdom of current subsidies.
The rental housing market in the United States exists at the mercy of a number of
complex economic and legal institutions. The federal government, through indirect tax
subsidies in the form of tax deductions and credits, has an immense impact upon rental
housing. 3 Furthermore, investment in residential rental property is increasingly viewed
merely as one of a large number of possible investment choices, and is therefore subject to
capital market forces and competition for investment dollars. State and local governments
also exercise substantial influence over residential housing through the vast panoply of
legal controls they may impose, such as zoning laws, rent control laws, cooperative and
condominium controls, and building codes. All of these measures affect the profitability
of rental housing as an investment. 4
t Copyright © 1985 Boston College Law School.
* Both authors wish to thank Marion W. Benfield, Jr. for his helpful comments on an early draft
of this article.
** Associate Professor of Law, University of Illinois. B.A., M.A., Haverford College, M.A.,
Cambridge University, ID., Yale Law School. The author wishes to thank Joel Shapiro, Class of
1985, University of Illinois College of Law.
*** Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law, Indianapolis. B.S. in Eco-
nomics, Purdue University (The Krannert School of Management), 1977,1a, University of Florida,
1980, L.L.M., University of Illinois, 1983. The author wishes to thank Jerry D. Zant and Kenneth
Braxton for their helpful research assistance.
' The notion that homeownership is a basic entitlement of every citizen may be traced back to
the political situation immediately following World War II. See generally THE. REPORT OF THE PRES].
DENT's COMMISSION ON HOUSING xviii-xxvii (1982) [hereinafter cited as REPORT].
• The average purchase price of a new house in the United States (in a survey of 32 major
metropolitan areas) currently is approximately $94,000. If one assumes that a potential borrower
would finance 80 percent of this purchase price, he or she would borrow $79,200. Assuming a 30
year, fixed-rate mortgage at 13.5 percent, monthly debt service would be approximately $915. See 18
LAND USE DIGEST, January 15, 1985, at 1-2. The average gross household income in the United
States currently is approximately $24,000 per year or $2,000 per month. Thus, the debt service on
the average house assuming favorable terms (fixed rate mortgage, 30 year amortization) would
require thirty-six percent of gross income, a figure, after taxes and insurance are added, that would
be prohibitive. See also HOUSING SUPPLY AND AFFORDABILITY 12 (F. Schnidman and J. Silverman eds.
1983) [hereinafter cited as HOUSING SUPPLY AND AFFORDABILITY].
a Of course, this impact is intended. The tax code is used as a method of subsidizing housing, see
infra notes 20-51 and accompanying text.
▪See infra notes 52-185 and accompanying text.
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This article will first examine the various ways federal, stale, and local laws affect the
availability and affordability of residential rental property. Second, this article will suggest
that. at the present time, federal policies towardsiaFizi rental housing, as expressed
primarily in the tax laws, are in substantial conflict with state and local policies. This
conflict results in economic inefficiency and misallocation of resources in the housing
market. Third. this article will suggest that local housing policy has non-local fiscal effects,
and that federal programs to alleviate state and local housing problems in some areas
often create a subsidy for those areas to the detriment of the residents of the other areas
not so highly subsidized. Consequently, all taxpayers must pay for the inefficiency of
misdirected local housing policies. Fourth, this article will su gest that because of the
f increasingly large numbers of Americans who cannot afford to purchase a home and
must therefore rely upon the availability of rental housing, and because of the economic
and social advantages offered by rental housing as opposed to home ownership, it is
necessary to rationalize and make consistent the federal, stale, and local measures affect.-
ing housing to ensure a continuing supply of affordable and adequate rental housing
stock, even at the expense of reducing the supply of owner-occupied122Tim Finally, this
article will suggest that new federal legislation specifically directed against state and local
laws inconsistent with the proposed policy be enacted, that the residential  rentalhousing
market. be
 placed in federal rather than state or local control, and that the federal
government shift the focus of its subsidies to low and moderate income renters affected
by increased rental housing costs.
To have efficient allocation of scarce housing dollars, people should be confronted
with the true costs of their housing choices. The subsidy, for instance, to be provided for
home ownership by way of tax deductions for home mortgage interest and state and local
property taxes for the fiscal years 1984-1989 amounts to $255.8 billion dollars in uncol-
lected revenue.' Most of the benefit from these tax deductions goes to middle and upper
income households." By reducing or eliminating subsidies for home ownership the choice
between owning or renting will he made on the basis of what each individual or family can
afford to purchase. While a basis for providing a subsidy 10 certain low or moderate
income renters to ensure at least a minimum level of shelter may exist, little justification
exists for using scarce housing dollars to subsidize the acquisition of home ownership
equity and living space for people earning more income than fifty percent of other
Americans.'
• 18 LAND USE DtcEsT, January 15, 1985, at 3 (this figure consists of $185.3 billion for the home
mortgage interest deduction and $70.5 billion for the state and local property tax deduction).
▪ See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGFT OFFICE, THE HOUSING FINANCE: SYSTEM AND FEDERAL, POLICY:
RECENT CHANCES AND OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE (1983).
In 1981, for example, households with annual incomes between $20,000 and $50,000
— forty-one percent of all households — received sixty-three percent of the benefits
from the deductibility of mortgage interest and fifty-five percent of the benefits front
the deductibility of property tax payments on owner-occupied units. In that same tax
year, households with incomes greater than $50,000 — seven percent of all households
— realized twenty-nine percent and thirty-seven percent, respectively, of all the benefits
from these provisions.
Id. at 24 -25.
▪The authors recommend that rental assistance be provided to below average income earners
through a voucher program. The voucher program should not subsidize individuals earning more
than the average income, and those individuals should likewise receive fewer direct and indirect
subsidies from the federal government. For further discussion of the proposed voucher system of
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Several basic premises are helpful in understanding the analysis set forth in this
article. Under a common definition, the "residential rental housing market" encompasses
two classes of participants, renters and landlords. While this market definition is useful
for a number of purposes, such as analyzing the relationships between the two groups,
another, broader market definition also exists. It can be argued that the residential rental
market is actually a sub-market of the total residential housing market, where there are
three participants (in addition to governments): renters, landlords, and home owners.
The value of this extended market definition is that it is towards this broader residential
market that federal, state, and local housing policy is oriented. 8
 Indeed, if one assumes
that there is a limited amount of financial aid available for subsidizing all types of housing,
one sees that a tension exists not simply between landlords and renters, but among
landlords, renters, and homeowners. 5
 It is this tension that government must mediate. As
competitors for governmental housing dollars, homeowners must be taken into account
for purposes of this analysis in any policy decision about rental housing.
This article's approach to the prohlem of rental housing is also premised on the belief
that, from the investment standpoint, there is nothing special about rental housing, so
that the decision to invest in rental housing will be based principally upon an analysis of
potential risk and return."' A rational individual with a specified amount to invest will
choose from among available options the investment that maximizes return and mini-
mizes risk. A rational investor will invest in residential housing if and only if it is the best
investment available to him or her. Factors such as the availability of tax benefits will only
be significant with respect to their impact upon bottom-line yield and the risk of not
receiving such a yield." Thus, for instance, if as a result. of governmental regulation the
return on an investment in residential rent al property is less than the return on municipal
bonds, and the risks inherent in the two investments are comparable, the rational investor
will choose municipal bonds." The effects of governmental regulation on the viability of
residential rental property as an investment are, therefore, of major significance, and the
maintenance of an adequate supply of privately owned residential rental property will he
directly dependent upon such regulation. This proposition, of course, is neither new nor
radical, but it is too oft en forgotten today by commentators and by legislators.
I. RENTAL HOUSING y.S. HOME Owxio
The current trends in home ownership costs show that the average home is no longer
affordable to the average home buyer and the gap between the two is not expected to
subscribers, see infra notes 173-79 and accompanying text. See infra notes 20-51 and accompanying
text for a discussion of federal subsidies and notes 186-87 and accompanying text for a discussion of
federal tax changes.
On the one hand, it is possible to differentiate the rental market from the owner-occupied
market with some overlap. Viewed broadly, however, both would-be renters and homeowners are
seeking housing, and politically, both renters and homeowners can often he treated simply as
"consumers of housing."
9 A basic assumption of this article is that potential subsidy funds arc limited. See infra notes
173-87 and accompanying text. See generally Holism; Surety AND AFFORDABILITY, supra note 2, at
11-28.
" Generally, risk bears a direct relationship to return in a rational market; the higher the risk
required, the higher the return demanded by the investor.
" All factors influencing return and risk can he quantified and used to "discount" potential
return. Thus every investment may he analyzed in terms of an expected bottom-line return.
" Irrational investment decisions are ignored here, but it is acknowledged that some investors
will choose a particular asset on unique and subjective bases, that is, they "like" real estate and, thus,
derive a portion of their investment return in the form of non-monetary, personal satisfaction,
658	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 26: 655
diminish. 13 The substantial disparity between the average American's income and the cost.
of the average home brings into question the wisdom of continued mass subsidies to
support home ownership at a time of record federal deficits and high interest rates.
Several reasons make favoring rental housing over home ownership reasonable." In
contrast to the typical single family residential home ownership unit, the average rental
housing unit, as part of a multi-unit structure, can be built with higher density use of land,
which in many urban areas is a significant cost factor in determining housing affordabil-
ity." Additionally, a probable basis exists for assuming that household expectations are
significantly different for home ownership as opposed to renting. The standard by which
many people judge home ownership is by the suburban one or two story home on an
individual lot with multiple bedrooms, family rooms, garage, and more than one bath-
room.' Cost considerations are slowly reducing these expectations but the dream
continues for many home buyers." in contrast, the image associated with rental housing
tends to be of a housing unit with fewer rooms and less total square footage, 18
 Thus, the
13 For further discussion see supra notes 1-12 and accompanying text. See also HOUSING SUPPLY
AND AFFORDABILITY, supra note 2, at 11-28.
" There is general debate over the superiority of home ownership to renting. Some argue that
actual home ownership as opposed to renting is the most rewarding form of tenure and that it fosters
better personal maintenance of the nation's housing stock. See M. FRIEDMAN & R. FRIEDMAN, FREE TO
CHOOSE 110-11 (1980) [hereinafter cited as M. FRIEDMAN & R. FRIEDMAN]; J. KEMENY, THE MYTH OF
HOME OWNERSHIP — Private Versus Public Choices in Housing Tenure 11 (1981) (referring to
government publications from the United Kingdom, the United States, and Australia) [hereinafter
cited as J. KEMENY]. On the other hand, others believe such a view is merely the product of a
sociological bias towards home ownership reflected in economic and political arrangements designed
to encourage owning in English speaking countries such as the United States, England, and Au-
stralia. See id. at 1-18. Also to be considered in this debate are historical indications favoring the
efficiency and innovative potential of rental housing in the implementation of new technology and
design due to shared facilities and higher density land-use. See G. WRIGHT, Bull-DING 'rHE DREAM —
A Social History of Housing in America 135-51 (1981) [hereinafter cited as C. WRIGHT]. Further-
more, an argument can be made that as people take longer tenure in rental housing and begin to
view it as long-term housing, they will have increased incentive to take care of their housing units.
" Housing costs today are leading to reduced consumer expectations and attempts to increase
housing density by various methods such as increased renting of space in owner occupied homes,
infill construction, and reduced zoning restrictions. See Rethinking Single -Family Zoning, in HOUSING
SUPPLY AND AFFORDABILITY, supra note 2, at 195-98; Evaluating I nclusionary Housing Programs, in
HOUSING SUPPLY AND AFFORDABILITY, Supra note 2, at 199-201; Housing Conversion: A Strategy In
Increasing the Housing Supply, in HOUSING SUPPLY AND AFFORDABILITY, Slipra note 2, at 213-16; Shared
Housing, in Housixc SUPPLY AND AFFORDABILITY, supra note 2, at 225-28.
" See generally HOUSING SUPPLY AND AFFORDABILITY, supra note 2, at 22-24. New homes are
getting bigger — the medium priced new home increased from 1,495 square feet in 1965 to 1,645
square feet in 1979, an increase of 10 percent. Id. at 22. See also U.S. CEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
RENTAL HOUSING: A NATIONAI. PROBLEM THAT NEEDS IMMEDIATE ATTENTION 8 (1979) (preference
of second and third-time buyers is for larger homes with many amenities) [hereinafter cited as U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RENTAL HOUSING].
" See Gottschalk, Trendy Dwellings —The "Affordable" Home Turns Out to Be Tiny and Not Really
Cheap, Wall St. J., Dec. 7, 1983, at 1, col. 1 (High housing costs, especially in expensive urban areas,
are making developers build smaller units so that ownership will be affordable to the vast market of
first-time buyers. Use of sky lights, mirrored walls, elimination of hallways, and scaling down of
appliance sizes are techniques used to give a feeling of "open space" and create an illusion of more
housing space while square footage and total costs are reduced.).
See generally C. WRIGHT, supra note 14, at 142-44 (The historic development of urban
apartments brought about complaints over too little space, especially in the less expensive buildings.
The authors believe that these concerns are still on the minds of many consumers.).
May 1985]	 AMERICAN HOUSING POLICY	 659
expectations of renters might be more easily met than those of homeowners. These
factors have at least an arguable impact on the choice of favoring rental housing over
home ownership.
In a more substantive sense at least two significant differences exist between rental
housing and home ownership that lead to the conclusion that, as a matter of national
policy.,,rental housing should be favored. First, the access costs to rental housing are
significantly lower than those associated with home ownership. The average renter may
pay one month's rent and a security deposit to gain possession of a rental unit. For home
ownership, the home buyer is generally required to pay 5 percent to 20 percent of the
equity value of the property, in addition to substantial closing costs to acquire posses-
sion. )9 Second, rental housing is cheaper than ownership of a comparable home because
the renter is purchasing less than the home buyer. The home buyer purchases a fee
simple interest in the real property while the renter purchases a limited leasehold estate,
which leaves a valuable asset still in the hands of the landlord-owner. The landlord's fee
ownership interest in the rental housing is a valuable right that can he sold to other
investors, mortgaged, or used as collateral for other investments. Furthermore, any
appreciation in the property will accrue to the benefit of the landlord, not the tenant.
Since the landlord retains these valuable interests with rental housing, the rental of
equivalent housing units with equivalent per unit construction costs should be lower thani .,
the monthly payment needed for home ownership, in the absence of a subsidy.
11, FEDERAL. SUBSIDIES
The federal government is the major source of subsidy funds to the residential
housing market. 2° Two types of subsidy to housing are provided by the federal govern-
ment. The first type is a direct or cash subsidy. A direct subsidy involves an actual
expenditure by the federal government for a specified type of property development or
to a specified target group of housing users. Generally, direct federal subsidies for
housing have been targeted at two primary groups — low-income families and the elderly.
During the past decade, there have been a number of different direct federal subsidy
programs. Some have involved direct cash supplementation of housing finance costs,
others have involved direct cash payments to cover a portion of fair market rental costs.
Perhaps the most successful direct subsidy programs have been the Veterans Administra-
tion (VA) and Federal Housing Administration (FHA) mortgage insurance programs,
where government agencies encourage lending to home buyers at affordable rates by
providing mortgage insurance to lenders:2 ' Some programs have provided subsidies
primarily for owner-occupied housing," while others have provided subsidies for resi-
dential rental housing.'23
19 The home buyer will have to put down varying degrees of equity depending on the type of
financing selected. A Federal Housing Administration insured loan may allow up to ninety-five
percent financing so that only five percent equity is required by the buyer, where a conventional loan
may only allow eighty percent financing and require twenty percent equity by the buyer.
2" Some states and localities provide cash subsidies for certain types of housing. Compared to
the size and scope of federal subsidies, however, these subsidies are de minimus.
21 See REPORT, supra note I, at 157-66.
" The mortgage interest subsidy provided in section 235 of the National Housing Act, 12
U.S.C. § 1715z (1982), is an example of such a program.
'a The rental subsidies provided in sections 221(d)(3) and 221(d)(4) of the National Housing
Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 17151(d)(3), (d)(4) (1982), are examples of such programs. See generally B. JAcons,
K. HARNEY, C. EDSON AND B. LANE, GUIDE TO FEDERAL HOUSING PRoGRANts (1982).
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While federal direct cash subsidy programs have played an important role in the
housing market for the past several decades, their scope and impact has been far less than
the scope of indirect subsidies in the form of tax benefits for real property ownership. By
far the greatest of these subsidies is the deduction allowed for mortgage interest pursuant.
to Internal Revenue Code ("Code") section 163, allowed both to residential and commer-
cial owners. 24 Also of great importance and wide scope is t he allowance of depreciation
pursuant to section 168 of the Code to commercial owners."' Indeed, the combination of
the interest deduction and depreciation deduction has made ownership of rental prop-
erty virtually synonymous with tax shelter.'"
In addition to these measures, a number of other tax provisions provide substantial
incentives for residential property ownership, both rental and owner-occupied. These
measures range from tax credits available to homeowners to make their houses energy
efficient, 27 to credits for rehabilitation of older buildings and historic structures,' to tax
exemptions allowed for interest paid on mortgage subsidy bonds.`" In addition, the
exemption of real property from the at-risk rules cif Code section 465 also provides a
substantial incentive for choosing real estate as an investment medium .""
The various tax subsidies for real estate included in the Internal Revenue Code are
targeted to different. taxpayer groups and to different types of transactions. An examina-
tion of several of the most important. subsidy provisions makes this pattern clear. First,
consider depreciation under Code section 167 and cost recovery deductions under Code
section 168. In general, section 167 distinguishes between property first placed in service
by the taxpayer ("new property") and property owned by a taxpayer placed in service by a
previous owner ("used property").' Second, section 167 distinguishes between residential
rental property and commercial-industrial property.'= Generally, new residential rental
property is favored under section 167. This type of property may he depreciated using
the most accelerated methods permissible: sum-of-the-years digits method or double
declining balance method.' The next most favored is new commercial-industrial prop-
erty, followed by used residential rental property, followed finally by used commercial-
industrial property." Code section 168, applicable to most property placed in service after
1981, eliminates the significance of the distinction bet ween new and used property, but.
retains the distinction between residential rental property and commercial-industrial
property." Under section 168 all 'real property used in a trade or business may he
depreciated using either the straight-line method or a schedule based upon the 175%
declining balance method." Section 168 itself does not distinguish between residential
24 See 1.R.C. § 163 (1982) (mortgage interest deduction).
" See I.R.C. §§ 167, 168 (1982) (depreciation and cost recovery deduction).
21' In this article tax shelter is used to refer to an invest 'neat yielding such a significant return in
the form of' tax benefits to the extent that the tax benefits are a principal motivation for investment.
See R. WEsTn.,:, LEXICON OF TAX TeastisoLocv 764-65 (1984).
" I.R.C. § 44C (1982) (energy tax credit).
I.R.C. § 48(a)(1)(E) (1982) (rehabilitation credit).
" I.R.C. § 103A (1982) (mortgage subsidy bonds).
3" See 1.R.C. § 465 (1982) (at-risk rules).
3 '	 R.C. § 167(j)(1), (5) (1982).
32 1.R.C. § 167(j)(2) (1982).
33 Id .
34 See 1.R.C. § 167(j)(1), (4), (5) (1982).
3,
 Of course, the old section 167 distinctions are still applicable to property not suhject to I.R.C.
§ 168.
I.R.C. § 168(b)(2) (1982).
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property and commercial-industrial property. This distinction, however, is of the utmost
significance regarding the recapture of sale proceeds and recharacterivation of such
proceeds as ordinary income pursuant to Code sections 1245 and 1250. Prior to 1981 all
real property depreciated under section 167 was subject to the recapture rules of section
1250, so that the excess of cumulative accelerated depreciation over what straight-line
depreciation would have been at the time of sale was recaptured as ordinary income."
This treatment was more favorable than the treatment accorded tangible personal prop-
erty under section 1245. The full amount of any depreciation allowed on such tangible
personal property tinder section 1245 was recaptured as ordinary income.'" The Eco-
nomic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA) modified these rules and reclassified
commercial-industrial property depreciated by an accelerated method as section 1245
recovery property subject to full recapture of all depreciation." Residential rental prop-
erty remains section 1250 property subject only to recapture of excess accelerated depre-
ciation." Thus, under the rules of sections 167 and 168, a hierarchy of subsidies has been
established in which residential rental property is most favored.
Whereas the Code provisions relating to depreciation and cost recovery deductions
are targeted at specific types of property, the deductions for interest and certain taxes
permitted under Code sections 163 and 164, respectively, are not so targeted." Indeed,
while owners of residential rental property arc permitted to use such deductions, a large
proportion of revenue lost. as a result of section 163 is lost to owners of single-family
homes. In effect, the section 163 interest deduction is a massive subsidy for home-
owners. 4 '
Generally, neither t he depreciation nor interest deductibility, provisions of' the Code
are targeted at specific economic classes of individuals. This lack of close control is
characteristic also of most of the other significant subsidy provisions contained in the
Code." For instance, the exemption from t he at-risk rules for real property under section
465 applies to all real property, other than mineral property, used in a trade or business
or held for investment, regardless of the particular use or the character of the user.
Similarly, such benefits as the tax credits provided for solar energy equipment, for
rehabilitation of older structures, and fir preservation and rehabilitation of historic
structures are all geared to types of property or transactions with no restrictions regard-
ing the income or economic status of the owners or users.
In fact, only two groups are targeted by a number of tax subsidy provisions for real
estate — the elderly and low-income families. For instance, residential rental property
occupied by qualifying low-income tenants may he depreciated using the double declining
balance method under section 168 rather than the 175% declining balance method."
Another example of a special, targeted tax subsidy is permitting five-year depreciation of
the costs of rehabilitating structures occupied by qualifying low-income families," These
37 See I.R.C. § 1250(8)(1) (1982) (Fecal-rime of accelerated depreciation on real property).
1.R.C. § 1245(a)(1) (1982) (recapture of accelerated depreciation on personal property).
39 I.R.C. § 124500(3) (1982).
I.R.C. § 1245(a)(5)(A) (1982).
41 See I.R.C. §§ 163, 164 (1982).
42 See Hellmuty, Homeowner Preferences, in CON1PREHENSIVE INCOME TAx.vrioN 163-72 (J.
Pechman ed. 1977).
" Of course, the deduction is also available to non-homeowners since section 163 of the Code
permits the deductibility of' all interest subject to the limitations of sections 163(d) and 265.
" I.R.C. § 168(b)(2)(A)(ii) (1982).
I.R.C. § 167(K) (1982).
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targeted subsidy provisions, however, are relatively few in number, are limited exclusively
to low-income and elderly individuals, and are limited in value. The major subsidies, such
as depreciation and interest deductibility, as noted, are available to taxpayers who enter
into specific transactions or conduct certain activities, regardless of their socio-economic
group.
If the structure of federal tax subsidies to real estate is viewed from a macroeconomic
perspective, a number of points become clear. Federal tax structure is basically a system
for reallocating wealth among the tax-paying public. The federal government acts as a
clearing-house for collecting revenue and a decisionmaking body regarding how collected
revenues will be allocated among competing interests. In the real estate area, as well as
other areas, the incentives provided by the federal government through tax subsidies
have major economic impact. 1n the housing market, because they affect the cost of
different transactions differently (that is, rental versus residential), the subsidies deter-
mine in part where investment capital will flow.
The use of tax subsidies for real estate may be criticized on a number of grounds.
One possible ground is allocative inefficiency. The Congressional Budget Office (CHO)
conducted a study in 1977 to determine the extent to which so-called "tax shelter"
subsidies — depreciation and deductibility of interest — were the most efficient means of
subsidizing selected types of income-producing real estate." The CBO study found that
indirect tax subsidies are a highly inefficient mechanism precisely because a great propor-
tion of the subsidy does not benefit real property and its users, but rather benefits
syndicators, contractors, and other intermediaries. 17 The study concluded that if the
purpose of tax subsidies is to provide incentives for construction or maintenance of
various types of property to ensure a continuing supply of adequate and affordable real
estate, direct grants would be far more effective than the use of indirect tax subsidies as an
allocation device."
A second criticism that can be leveled at the existing federal tax subsidy structure is
that it does not effectively further the policies underlying it. As noted above, with the
exception of lower income and elderly individuals, no special group of users of real
property is directly the focus of any major tax subsidy provision." Interest deductions are
available to all homeowners, regardless of annual income. High income individuals
benefit from the section 163 deduction as do moderate income individuals. Similarly, the
owner of conventional residential real estate designed for high income renters can use
exactly the same depreciation schedule as the owner of residential rental property de-
signed for a non-subsidized moderate income group.
Also troubling is the vulnerability of the federal tax subsidy to compromise by state or
local regulation. Any owner of qualifying property can, for instance, take advantage of
the section 168 cost recovery deduction. The economic benefits provided by this tax
subsidy, however, can still he taken away from that owner by state or local regulation. For
instance, a developer of residential rental property may benefit from an increased depre-
ciation allowance, only to have that benefit offset by a local rent control ordinance. In
effect, a state or local government, knowing that an owner of property will not only
receive an economic return in the form of rent, but also an additional return from
as
	 BUDGET OFFICE, REAL ESTATE TAX SHELTER SUBSIDIES AND DIRECT SUBSIDY
A LTERNATIVES (1977).
' Id. at 2-11.
48 Id. at 59-93.
49 Other uses of real estate which are considered separately for tax purposes, such as for
extraction of minerals, are not considered in this article. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 465 (1982).
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federally provided tax benefits, may decide to shift some of that composite income away
from the landlord to renters simply by artificially limiting rents.'" Nothing in the federal
tax subsidy system as it presently exists ensures that the broadly defined target groups
receive the full benefits of the subsidy provided for them by the federal government. State
and local governments, through regulation, can simply reallocate the effects of all or a
portion of the federal subsidy to target groups of their own choosing — groups the
federal government may well not want to aid."
Thus, the current system of tax subsidies provided for real estate, in general, and the
housing market, in particular, have a number of troublesome aspects. To a great extent
the subsidies are not targeted at specific income groups, thereby allowing the wealthy to
use federal aid as much as, or more than, lower or middle-income individuals. Second,
these subsidies may well be less efficient in terms of the percentage of each subsidy
actually put into use in the intended activity than other alternatives. Third, these federal
subsidies may be reduced or eliminated by non-federal regulation, thereby permitting
state and local governments to usurp federal decisionmaking power as to these subsidy
funds.
III. STATE POLICY TOWARDS RESIDENTIAL RENTAL. PROPERTY
In addition to federal law, substantial legal considerations at the state level can lead to
problems in housing. In general, the implementation of state and local housing policy has
created disincentives for investment in residential rental property. Various state judicial
decisions and legislative initiatives have reduced the profitability and flexibility of residen-
tial rental property ownership. This section of the article will examine specific areas of
state intervention that have affected investment in the increasingly important rental
housing market. In particular, rent regulation, regulation of the landlord-tenant relation-
ship, regulation of conversions of housing from rental to ownership form, and the impact
of restrictive land use and development requirements will be analyzed.
A. Rent Regulation
The impact of rent. regulations on construction and maintenance of rental housing,
and the secondary effects on home ownership, are of great importance to the formulation
of any national policy on housing. Residential property rents have not kept pace with
inflation and 'real' rents have actually fallen over the past twenty years. 53 Inducing
investment in the rental housing market, therefore, will require a real increase in rents. 55
In the short run, rent regulations that prevent or hinder the necessary rent increases may
appear beneficial to tenants already occupying rental housing, but in the long run such
"' Put differently, regulation such as rent control may be viewed as tantamount to a tax imposed
by the state or local government enabling it to allocate these revenues to its own targeted groups.
" At the very least, uneven regulatory policies may create geographic-based allocations not
envisaged by the federal government; ,see infra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
52 THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON Housisal 90 (1982) (real rents down 8.8
percent in the past 20 years).
s3 See REPORT, supra note 1, at 90; A. DOWNS, RENTAL HOUSING IN THE 1980s 3-4 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as A. DowNs). Real rents fell about 8.4 percent from 1960 to 1980, or roughly 4.2
percent each decade. Additionally, the real value of rental housing properties in the United States
sustainable from rents alone appears to have fallen fifty percent since 1960. Id. at 4. This drop in
value results from much faster increases in operating costs and interest rates than in rents. Id.
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regulations are detrimental to everyone because they reduce the number of available
The increasing inability of Americans to afford home ownership will add to the
demand for rental housing in the 1980's and beyond.''' As is the case with most market
changes, such increased demand or need for rental housing will not be met by an
immediate increase in the rental housing stock. Rather, competitive forces in the housing
market should signal the need for more rental housing to investors and bring more
investment dollars into this sector of the market.'" Even under the best circumstances,
however, financing, development approval, and construction time will temporarily leave
the rental housing market in disequilibrium and produce short-term "shortages" or
pressures on the existing rental stock. Compounding these natural market adjustment
time problems are regulations and restrictions that add to the cost of construction and
that reduce the profitability of rental housing ownership relative to other investment
alternatives. In responding to the increased needs of the rental housing market., investors
and developers will be concerned with the rate of return, measured by projected rental
income flow, available from their investment in this somewhat risky market..
The President's Commission on Housing has determined that rent regulations can
have a deleterious impact on the condition of the nation's rental housing stock.'" Rent
regulations adversely affect. an investor's potential return on rental housing investments
and can lead to avoidance of or disinvestment from residential rental property if regu-
lated rent levels are set below the rate necessary to compensate for the time, value, and
risk of investment."" The Commission found that rent regulations caused a reduction in
the quality of existing rental housing, discouraged new invest meal in rental housing, and
in extreme cases could lead to the abandonment of retrial housing."
" See REPORT, supra. note 1, at 90-94: A. DowNs, supra note 53, at vii, 3 (discussing the
importance of profitability); Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: Causes and
Consequences, 69 CORNELL L. Rev, 517, 555 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Rabin].
" A. DOWNS, supra note 53, at vii, 	 In 1980 there were 28.6 million rental units in the United
States, constituting one third of all households. Id, at 2. Eight out of nine such units were provided by
private owners for profit with about sixty percent of the units in structures of fewer that) five units. A
third of the latter were single-family homes. Id.
" See generally Olsen, Competitive Theory of the Housing Market, in HOUS/NC URBAN AMERICA
234-44 (J. Pynoos, R. Schafer, and C. Hartman eds. 1980) (discussing market forces at work as they
affect housing).
" See REPORT, supra note 1, at 91-92.
" See id.
" See id. (abandonment is likely where operation as rental property is seen as unprofitable and
the landlord is prevented from converting the units to either condominiums or cooperatives). See,
e.g., Guenther, Landlord's Unusual Response to Rent Control Stirs Fight, Walt 5(.1, Mar. 21, 1984, at 31,
col. I (hereinafter cited as Guenther, Landlord's Unusual Response]. This article discussed a landlord
who, as a result of the Santa Monica, California rent restrictions sought to demolish his building to
sell the vacant land, which could be used for other purposes than rental housing because as vacant
land the property is worth more than as rental property under the rent control regulations, Santa
Monica, in turn, is seeking to prevent the demolition of the building so that it would remain rental
housing. See also REPORT, supra note 1, at 92 (rent regulations amount to a redistribution of income
from landlords to tenants akin to a tax, and operate in an inefficient and inequitable manner; this
"tax" imposed by rent control will encourage landlords not to invest in rental housing while
encouraging tenants to seek out below-market rents; Muth, Redistribution of Income Through Regula-
tions in Housing, 32 Emottv L.J. 691, 693-98 (1983) (discussion of rent control and redistribution of
income). For expanded symposium discussion on rent control, see generally 32 EMORY L.J. 690-819
(1983)).
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To assess the impact of rent regulations on the supply of rental housing, one must
examine the current status of rent regulations and their effect on private investment.
Currently, at least 200 cities, seven slates, and the District of Columbia have rent. control
or tent stabilization regulations. ° In addition to state control of rents, Congress has on
several occasions concerned itself with rent controls for limited periods in response to
national emergencies."' Originally, governmental authority for rent control was based on
a finding by the legislature of an emergency situation that affected or would affect the
supply of rental housing. 62 Today this requirement of an emergency situation as justifica-
tion for exercise of the police power is no longer required." Rent controls can be upheld
as long as they bear a real and substantial relationship to the public health, morals, safety,
and welfare and as long as the legislature has not acted arbitrarily in implementing the
controls."
Rcpoirroupra note 1, at 91 (over 200 cities have rent regulations). The seven states that have
rent control or stabilization regulations are; California, see, e.g., BirIcenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 17
Cal. 3d 129, 550 P.2c1 1001, 130 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1976); Connecticut, see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§
7-148b-148f (West Stipp. 1984); Florida, see FLA. STAT. ANN. §11 125.0103, 166.043 (West Supp. 1984)
(for Florida cases dealing with the rent control issue, see City of Miami Beach v. Frankel, 363 So. 2c1
555 (Fla. 1978); City of Miami Beach v. Forte Towers, Inc., 305 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 1974); City of Miami
Beach v. Fleetwood Hotel, Inc., 261 So. 2d 801 (Fla. (1972)); Maine, see ME. REV. STAT. ANN, tit. 30,
§§ 5371-5376 (1964 & Supp. 1984); Massachusetts, see MASS. G. LAWS ANN. ch. 40 app., §§ 1-I to
-14 (West Supp. 1984-85); New Jersey, see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-77 (West Supp. 1984-85); New
York, see N.Y. UNCONSOL, LAWS §§ 5881-8597 (McKinney 1974 & Supp. 1984-85). Rent control has
also been adopted by the District of Columbia, see D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 45-1601 to 45-1663 (1981 &
Supp. 1984). CJ: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1329 (Supp. 1984-85) (making the issue one of state
rather than local control). Alaska and Maryland previously had rent control legislation in effect,
though not in current statutes. For discussion of these provisions, see Public Safety Employees Ass'it
v. State, 658 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1983); Westchester West No. 2 1.td. Partnership v. Montgomery
County, 276 Md. 448, 348 A.2cl 856 (1975).
" See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 340 U.S. 616, 618-21 (1951) (discussion of National Energy
Price Control Acts of 1942 and 1947); United States v. Wittek, 337 U.S. 346, 364-65 (1949)
(discussion of National Energy Price Control Act of 1942); Woods v. Hills, 334 U.S. 210, 211-14
(1948) (discussion of National Energy Price Control Act of 1942); Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S.
503, 505-07 (1944) (National Energy Price Control Act of 1942); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921)
(controls for housing emergency resulting from effect of World War I). See also Rabin, supra note 54,
at 555 (discussing rent control and federal government imposition of wage and price controls, which
included rents from August 15, 1971 to January 12, 1973). See also M. 1,Err, RENT CONTROL:
CONCEPTS, REALITIES, AND MECHANISMS 1-10 (1976).
n See Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d 129, 135, 550 P.2d 1001, 1006, 130 Cal. Rptr.
465, 470 (1976); Westchester West. No. '2 Ltd. Partnership v. Montgomery County, 276 Md. 448,
456-63, 348 A.2d 856, 861-65 (1975); Hutton Park Gardens v. Town Council of West Orange, 68
N.J. 543, 555-62, 350 A.2d 1, 7-10 (1975); Brunetti v. Borough of New Milford, 68 N.J. 576, 591.94,
350 A.2d 19, 27-28 (1975). See also Kennedy Bros., inc. v. Sinclair, 287 F. 972, 977-78 (D.C. Cir.
1923) (rent control is a legislative decision and the judiciary ought not to interfere with its decision).
Contra City of Miami Beach v. Fleetwood Hotel, Inc., 261 So. 2d 801, 804 (Fla. 1972).
" See Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d 129, 135, 550 P.2d 1001, 1006, 130 Cal. Rptr.
465, 470 (1976); Westchester West No. 2 Ltd. Partnership v. Montgomery County, 276 Md. 448,
456-63, 348 A.2d 856, 861-65 (1975); Hutton Park Gardens v. Town Council of West Orange, 68
N.J. 543, 555-62, 350 A.2d I, 7-10 (1975); Brunetti v. Borough of New Milford, 68 N.J. 576, 592-94,
350 A.2d 19, 27-28 (1975). Contra City of Miami Beach v. Fleetwood Hotel, Inc., 261 So. 2d 801,
804-05 (Fla. 1972). See generally Kennedy Bros. Inc. v. Sinclair, 287 F. 972, 977-78 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
64 Westchester West No. 2 Ltd. Partnership v. Montgomery County, 276 Md. 448, 454-55, 348
A.2d 856, 860 (1975). See also Hutton Park Gardens v. Town Council of West Orange, 68 N.J. 543,
563-64, 350 A.2d 1, 12 (1975).
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Rent regulations can take different forms, but they generally have a common pur-
pose of protecting tenants from "unfair" and dramatic rent increases while purporting to
provide landlords with a "fair" return on their investment. Determining the landlord's
fair return requires an initial valuation to establish a base rent from which periodic rent
adjustments can be made. The method of rental housing valuation therefore becomes
important."3
 Different methods of valuation can lead experts to different conclusions and
therefore a detailed explanation of such methods is necessary to evaluate the reasonable-
ness of the independent determinations reached." Once the legislature has determined
the method of valuation to be used for implementing rent regulations, the burden is on
the landlord to show that the method selected is improper." The legislative determina-
tion of valuation method will be upheld even if it is the least favorable method for the
landlord and even if it results in rent levels significantly below the market rent.""
For constitutional purposes, rent regulations are treated like other types of gov-
ernmental price regulation," even though the law traditionally has treated real property
differently from other areas of commercial endeavor.'" As long as permissible rent levels
do not amount to confiscation, they are legally supportable.n Although a landlord cannot
be forced to subsidize his tenants to meet social or economic•goals, the fairness of rents
need not be judged by their impact on profit or loss of individual landlords provided they
are not set at a rate that would be confiscatory to an efficient landlord. 72 In setting rent
" See generally Malloy, Lender Liability For Negligent Real Estate Appraisals, 1984 U. ILL. L. Rev. 53,
55-58 (discussion of appraisal methods and footnotes to other sources on methods of real estate
appraisal and valuation).
" See,e.g., Kennedy Bros., Inc. v. Sinclair, 287 F. 972, 973-77 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (different experts
arrived at different determinations of value for the property and the owner's investment).
r7
 See, e.g., Hartley Holding Corp. v. Gabel, 13 N.Y.2d 306, 308-09, 196 N.E.2d 537, 537-38, 247
N.Y.S.2d 97, 98-99 (1963) (New York City allowed landlords less than six percent return on their
property and used a 1954 property valuation and equalization rate despite the availability of a 1961
equalization figure). See also Benson Realty Corp. v. Beanie, 50 N.Y.2d 994, 995-96, 409 N.E.2d 948,
949, 431 N.Y.S.2d 475, 476-77 (1980), appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 1119 (1981) (even maladministration
or nonadminisfration does not serve as a basis for declaring such regulations unconstitutional). See
generally Guenther, Landlord's Unusual Response, supra note 59, at 31, col. 1. (some cities, like Santa
Monica, California, do riot allow a buyer of already rent controlled residential rental property to have
rent adjustments reflecting the new owner's purchase price or debt).
" See, e.g., Kennedy Bros., Inc. v. Sinclair, 287 F. 972, 977.78 (D.C. Cir. 1923); Zussman v. Rent
Control Bd. of Brookline, 37! Mass. 632, 637-39, 359 N.E.2d 29, 32-33 (1976). See generally
Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d 129, 155-56, 550 P.2d 1001, 1020-21, 130 Cal. Rptr. 465,
484-85 (1976).
" Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d 129, 157, 550 1).2d 1001, 1021, 130 Cal. Rptr. 465,
485 (1976); see also Hutton Park Gardens v. Town Council of West Orange, 68 N.J. 543, 556, 350
A.2d 1, 7 (1975).
7" Hutton Park Gardens v. Town Council of West Orange, 68 N.J. 543, 556, 350 A.2d 1, 7
(1975). "The renting of residential property is as much an essential enterprise as the retail sale of
food-stuffs, the extraction and processing of natural resources, the operation of a railroad, or the
conduct of a banking business and equally subject to public regulation when the need arises." Id.
(citations omitted).
71 Id. at 571, 350 A.2d at 16; Kennedy Bros., Inc, v. Sinclair, 287 F. 972, 977-78 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
7/ Troy Hills Village v. Township Council of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 68 N.J. 604, 620, 350 A.2d
34, 42 (1975); Hutton Park Gardens v. Town Council of West Orange, 68 N.J. 543, 569, 350 A.2d 1,
15 (1975). In Troy Hills Village the court stated:
[t]he test for confiscation is whether the ordinance permits an efficient landlord to
obtain a "just and reasonable" return on his property . . . . [F]rom a procedural point of
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levels that are not confiscatory for the efficient landlord, an individual landlord's actual
purchase price and financing costs are not determinative, since the rent setting authority
may classify hint or her as inefficient . 73 Unlike public utility rate regulation, rent control is
not concerned with balancing competing interests and establishing the best rent level."
To the contrary, rent control generally involves establishment of the lowest rent level
constitutionally permissible."
in some instances a landlord may be required to make capital improvements to his
rental housing, while rent regulations do not allow the relative costs to be recovered
through rental charges." When the requirement is assisted by legal sanctions for not
making capital improvements arid not maintaining minimal housing standards, the land-
lord is faced with a choice between legal penalties or financial hardship." That a land-
lord's costs are rising faster than permissible rents or that the landlord is sustaining
economic losses does not, in itself, make such rent regulation unconstitutional."
Some rent regulations attempt to address the landlord's cost problem by tying rent
adjustments to increases in the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Such adjustments may,
however, be limited to a percentage less than 100% of the increase in prices indicated by
the CPI." Adjustments on this basis do not overcome the disincentives of investing in
rental housing. By receiving periodic rent adjustments that are as little as 50% of the
annual increase in the CPI, the landlord's rent revenue continually lags behind inflation.
view, it is highly desirable (though not mandatory) that municipalities enact, as part of
their rent control ordinance, provisions under which landlords will be assured a just
and reasonable return.
68 N.J. 604, 620, 350 A.2d 34, 42 (1975).
" See Zussman v. Rent Control Bd. of Brookline, 371 Mass. 632, 638-40, 359 N.E.2d 29, 33-34
(1976). In Zussman the Rent Board used a property value of $550,000 even though the landlord had
just paid $700,000. Id. at 638, 359 N.E.2d at 33. The court found that the cost of 100 percent
financing actually used by the landlord did not have to be considered since the landlord should have
considered more conservative financing at seventy percent of fair market. value. Id. at 639-40, 359
N.E.2d 34.
78 Id. at 637, 359 N.E.2d at 32; Troy Hills Village v. Township Council of Parsippany-Troy Hills,
68 N.J. 604, 622, 350 A.2d 34, 43 (1975). See also Berger, The New Residential Tenancy Law — Are
Landlords Public Utilities?, 60 NEB, 1,, REV. 707, 716-27 (1981) (arguing that rental housing is being
treated like other industries subject to price and rate controls, and may therefore be like a public
utility) [hereinafter cited as Berger].
" Zussman v. Rent Control Bd. of Brookline, 371 Mass. 632, 637, 359 N.E.2d 29, 32 (1976)
(rent control can be unlike public utility rate regulation when it is used to establish the lowest rent
that is not confiscatory rather than to establish a rent that provides landlords with the lowest return
that will cover costs while providing ample incentive to come into arid stay in the market); Troy Hills
Village v. Township Council of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 68 N.J. 604, 622, 350 A.2d 34, 43 (1975). See
also Berger, supra note 74, at 716-27.
78 See, e.g., Brunetti v. Borough of New Milford, 68 N.J. 576, 595-96, 350 A.2d 19, 29 (1975).
" Id. at 596, 350 A.2d at 29.
78 Hutton Park Gardens v. Town Council of West Orange, 68 N.J. 543, 571-72, 350 A.2d 1, 16
(1975).
79 Brunetti v. Borough of New Milford, 68 N.J. 576, 584, 592, 350 A.2d 19, 23, 27 (1975);
Hutton Park Gardens v. Town Council of West Orange, 68 N.J. 543, 554, 572, 350 A.2d 1, 6, 16
(1975). The effect of a less than 100 percent Consumer Price Index (CP1) adjustment can be
illustrated by an example. Assume a rent adjustment limited to fifty percent of the increase in the
CPI. if the CPI goes up ten percent, the rent required to maintain a real rent return of $100 per
month should be allowed to increase to $110 per month, but instead will only increase to $105 (fifty
percent of the ten percent increase in the CPI). Thus, the landlord loses real income with each
increase in the CPI.
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Every year the landlord finds that rental income is less in "real or constant" dollars.
Individuals cannot he expected to continue investing in properties, the value of which
decreases as profitability is continually eroded by inflation.
The general public showed just how important real returns on investment were when
the rapid inflation of the early 1980's surpassed the regulated five percent rate of return
on their passbook savings accounts. In response to this below market rate of return,
consumers transferred millions of dollars from their savings accounts to less regulated
money market funds and other savings alternatives that offered positive rather than
negative real returns on their money.''' Investors in rental housing are no different from
other investors or the general public. To the extent that rent controls ensure that rental
housing will provide inadequate returns, individuals will seek alternative investment
opportunities. In this manner the regulation of rate of return, whether it be on passbook
accounts or on rents, 'has the same effect of moving investment monies to other more
profitable alternatives; in the first instance to mutual funds and in the latter to housing
that is not rent controlled, or other investments.
Many employees and recipients of governmental benefits have their salaries and
benefits indexed to the CPI or a similar index that responds to inflation. Few politicians,
however, are willing to tell these people that their salaries or benefits increases should be
set at a rate below the inflation rate. Indeed, some of these employees may even be tenants
in rent controlled buildings. While their landlord is limited to rent adjustments below
current market rates, these tenants receiving salaries or benefits fully adjusted for infla-
tion may actually be getting, at least indirectly, a double return on their money allocated
to cover housing costs. Since the CPI ostensibly accounts for market increases in housing
costs, these tenants get. a full adjustment for this purpose. Since the landlord is limited in
his or her ability to adjust rents upward, however, the tenant finds that rent actually
decreases in real terms. The tenant ends up with more disposable income that. can be used
for non-housing purposes. Although this situation may be beneficial for some current
tenants, it is hard to see how it will encourage people to construct, own, or invest in
residential rental property."
Rent regulations create disincentives for private investment in residential rental
property." They are also contrary to the current political trend favoring private initiative
while reducing governmental regulation. While localized short-term rental housing
shortages may occur, the presence of a shortage is not evidence of a market conspiracy by
landlords and it should not form the basis for attempts to emasculate the profitability of
" See generally M. MArusoN & J. DWYER, THE LAW OF REAL ESTATE FINANCING §§ 2.02(3)(a),
exhibit 2.4c, 2.02(3)(e) (Supp. No, 2, 1983) (disintermediation problem).
8' See generally Karginan v. Sullivan, 582 F.2d 131, 131-32 (1st Cir. 1978). This case involved
section 21(d)(3) of the National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. 17151(d)(3), relating to subsidized apartment
projects. Id. Even though HUD had strict guidelines on rent increases to protect tenants, the City of
Boston was allowed to reduce the rate of return further under its local rent controls. Id. But cf.
Marshal House, Inc. v. Rent Control Bd. of Brookline, 358 Mass. 686, 693, 266 N.E.2d 876, 882
(1971); City of Miami Beach v. Frankel, 363 So. 2d 555, 557 (Fla. 1978). Both of these cases involve
luxury apartments exempt from local rent controls, a situation providing incentive to build luxury
housing and disincentive to build housing for the poor.
82 See Edgerton, Your Best Investments For 1984, MONEY, Jan. 1984, 52, 65. Money magazine
recommended that the best investments were in real estate for 1984, including multi-unit residential
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residential rental property ownership." Short-term shortages observed in the rental
housing market are no different from such shortages observed in other reasonably
competitive markets." A temporary demand for rental housing that exceeds its current
supply will push rents higher, making investment in the market more attractive. With
more attractive investment potential, additional rental housing will be supplied until a
new market. equilibrium is reached.
If rents are not allowed to rise, Fewer incentives will exist for adding new units to the
stock of rental housing. Furthermore, as long as rents are kept artificially low, a below
market rate equilibrium will be established, generating increasing demand pressure for
rental housing as people seek inexpensive shelter, creating further market distortion and
increased upward pressure on rents. This vicious circle will lead to an outcry for more
regulation of rents so that landlords will not be able to "take advantage" of the rental
housing shortage. Rent control in turn will ensure that the shortage continues.
Rem regulations lead landlords to manipulate the law in attempts to avoid corn-
pliance, 85 to divest of residential rental properties," to refrain from maintenance or
capital improvements, 87 or to abandon their rent controlled properties altogether." The
persons who seemingly benefit from rent controls are tenants currently enjoying posses-
sion of rent-controlled housing. Their short-term gain, however, is offset by the long-
term societal loss of rental housing stock. Beyond the short term, both current and future
tenants will suffer from the disincentives to repair and improve existing rental stock.
To the extent that a coherent national policy for rental housing seeks to rely on the
operation of the market place, it must accept the need for increased rent. levels to attract
private investment. In so doing, national policy cannot ignore the needs of the low-to-
moderate-income renter. The low-to-moderate-income renter, however, can be protected
by a "safety net" of government benefits, without disrupting - the entire housing market.
Rather than rent regulations that drive private investment out of the rental housing
market, modified rental vouchers or subsidies could he made available to those potential
renters who need financial assistance to ensure their economic access to adequate shel-
ter. 89 With these kinds of subsidies, an incentive to construct rental housing in any
83 See generally City of Miami Beach v. Forte Towers, Inc., 305 So. 2d 764, 772 (Fla. 1974)
(Roberts, J., dissenting); Fresh Pond Shopping Center, Inc. v. Callahan, 388 Mass. 1051, 446 N.E.2d
1060, appeal dismissed, 104 S.Ct. 218 (1983); see also 104 S.Ct. at 218-20 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
84 See A. Dowxs, supra note 53, at 2, which states: "Eight out of nine occupied rental units are
provided by private owners for profit; the ninth is publicly subsidized. Private rental markets are
dominated by small scale operators. About 60 percent of all rental units are in structures with fewer
than five units." See also REPORT, supra note I, at 90. Both of these authorities indicate that a
reasonable basis for competition within the rental housing market exists.
as See Somma v. Hazlehurst & Savelli, [1978] 1 W.L.R. 1014, 1024-25, [1978] 2 All E.R. 1011;
Aldrington Garages, Ltd. v. Fielder, [19781 37 P. & C.R. 461, 471-72 {both cases allowing landlords to
avoid rent control acts in England by redefining the possession of the tenant as a license rather than a
tenancy, and thereby taking it out of the jurisdiction of rent control acts). See also Buchmann v. May
[1978] 2 All E.R. 993, 998-1000, 120 Sol. J. 384, (landlord avoids British Rent Acts by declaring his
possession as one for a "holiday," thereby fitting into an exemption from regulation). Contra Walsh v.
Griffiths-Jones, [1978] 2 All E.R. 1002, 1010. See generally Case & Comment, Lease or License to Evade
the Rent Act, 38 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 38, 38-44 (1979).
" REPORT, supra note 1, at 92.
" Id.
88 Id. See, e.g., Guenther, Landlord's Unusual Response, supra note 59, at 31, col. I .
89 See infra notes 173 -79 and accompanying text For a discussion of a proposal for a modified
voucher system.
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community where demand exceeds supply will still exist. Even if new rental housing is too
expensive for the unsubsidized renters, a combination of subsidy and "trickle down" or
"filtering" should suffice to ensure them shelter."
As the need for rental housing increases in the 1980's and beyond, it is becoming
important to reassess policies affecting investment in residential rental property. Cur-
rently, rent regulations are seen as a popular stop-gap measure to protect tenants from
perceived abuses that might arise from a rental housing shortage. Such policies, however,
seem ill-conceived and work to create disincentives rather than incentives for meeting our
nation's need for additional rental housing. Furthermore, they fail to provide any real
long-term benefits to the community as a whole and work to ensure a continuation of the
rental housing shortage.
B. Regulation of the Landlord and 'Tenant Relationship
While rent controls provide one disincentive to invest in residential rental housing,
other disincentives exist as well. In this light, it is important to consider the landlord and
tenant relationship. Over the years, the relationship between landlord and tenant has
become more complex." Urbanization and the movement of tenants to high rise apart-
ment buildings with common facilities shared by all tenants, but within the control of the
landlord, has fostered governmental concern for the maintenance of minimum standards
of safety and health." Building codes and legislation establishing duties and rights of
landlords and tenants reflect these standards." Some of these regulations such as mini-
mum standards for safe electrical wiring or structural soundness are desirable. Other
regulations have been passed to regulate the relationship between landlord and tenant by
setting out minimal standards of responsibility that each party must undertake." Unfor-
" See Hirsch, Hirsch & Margolis, Regression Analysis of the Effects of Habitability Laws Upon Rent: An
Empirical Observation on the Ackerman-Komesar Debate, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 1098, 1117-18 (1975).
9 ' See generally Rabin, supra note 54, at 517; Glendon, The Transformation of American Landlord-
Tenant Law, 23 B.C.L. Rev. 503 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Glendon]; Quinn Sc Phillips, The Law of
Landlord-Tenant: A Critical Evaluation of the Past with Guidelines for the Future, 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 225,
225-58 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Quinn & Philips]. See also Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d
616, 622-25, 517 P.2d 1168, 1171-74, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 707-10 (1974); Boston Hous. Auth. v.
Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 188-90, 293 N.E.2d 831, 837-38 (1973). In general, the articles and cases
indicate that in evolving, landlord and tenant law has moved from real property to contract law
emphasis, and from a focus on the value of the land itself to more of a service contract for living
space. Early leases were for agrarian purposes in which the tenant was concerned with the land and
being left alone by the landlord. Now, tenants want safe buildings and for the landlord to maintain
electrical, plumbing, and other facilities — the land itself is almost meaningless to the urban tenant.
92 See generally Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 623-25, 517 P.2d 1168, 1172 -74, I 1 1
Cal. Rptr. 704, 708-09 (1974); Glendon, supra note 91, at 508-09; Quinn & Phillips, supra note 91, at
230-39. See also, Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (in the
current legal environment, a lease is dominated more by contract law principles than by traditional
property law principles).
93 See Glendon, supra note 91, at 518-21. From the early to mid-1900's there was the rise of the
20th century administrative state that imposed more duties on the landlord-tenant relationship. Id.
The passage of the Housing Act of 1949 established a national policy of providing "a decent home
and suitable living environment for every American family." Id. at 519. By the 1950's, local building
codes setting standards for housing became popular and were widely adopted by cities seeking to
qualify for federal urban renewal funds. Id.
94
 The Uniform Residential Landlord Tenant Act (URLTA) represents an example of a major
attempt at legislative reform of landlord-tenant relationships. See Glendon, supra note 91, at 523. The
URLTA provides specific landlord obligations for such things as tenant security deposits, UNIV.
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tunately, these standards adversely affect the desirability of residential rental property as
an invesiment. 95 The effect of regulation of the landlord and tenant relationship is best
explored by looking at the developing law of implied warranties of habitability and
specific additional regulations.
Many state statutes have codified the implied warranty of habitability for rental
housing. 9° Together with housing code regulations, the implied warranty of habitability is
designed to guarantee tenants a safe and healthy living environment. The degree to
which these regulations have been effective in practice, however, and the extent to which
they have adversely affected the cost of rental housing are in dispute."
RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD TENANT ACT (URLTA) § 2.101, 7A U.L.A. 499 (1978 and Supp. 1985),
disclosure of relevant leasing information, URLTA § 2.102, and maintenance and repair, URLTA §
2.104. Additional obligations are imposed on tenants for upkeep of their rental units. URLTA §§
3.101-3.104. Significant enforcement ability is given to the tenant in the remedies section of the
URLTA, and various limitations are put on the landlord's ability to obtain summary eviction or
enforce self-help. See URLTA §§ 4.101-4.207. Section 4.101 basically provides a warranty of habita-
bility; section 4.104 allows rent deductions and the tenant obtaining services elsewhere, much like
"cover" under the Uniform Commercial Code; section 4.105 allows the tenant to raise landlord
noncompliance with any provision of the URLTA as a defense to the landlord's action for rent or
possession; and section 4.201 allows a landlord to terminate a lease if the tenants are causing a health
or safety hazard in their use or possession. Even states that have not fully adopted the URLTA have
been influenced by it in their judicial decisions, or have adopted parts of it. Glendon,supra note 91, at
523. States statutes adopting URLTA are: ALASKA STAT. §§ 34.03.010-.380 (1974); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 33-1301 to -1381 (1973 & Supp. 1984 -85); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 83.40-.64 (West 1973 & Supp.
1984); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 521-1 to -78 (1972 & Supp. 1984); Iowa CODE ANN. §§ 562A.I-.37
(West 1979 & Supp. 1984); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-2540 to -2573 (1983); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
383.500-.715 (Bobbs-Merrill 1972 & Supp. 1984); Mown CODE ANN. §§ 70-24-101 to -442 (1983);
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-1401 to -1449 (1975 & Supp. 1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 47 - 8 - 1 to -51 (1978);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, §§ 101-136 (West. Supp. 1984-85); OR. Rt:v. STAT, §§ 91.700 - .900 (1973 &
Supp. 1981); TENN. Cope ANN. §§ 66-28-101 to -516 (1982 & Supp. 1984); VA. CODE §§ 55-248.2 to
-248.40 (1974 & Supp. 1983).
States, in addition to the above-listed states, with statutes on or amounting to an implied
warranty of habitability include: CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 1941, 1941.1 (West 1954 & Supp. 1985); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN.. § 47a-7 (West Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5303 (1974); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN, §§ 2692-2693 (West 1952); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6021(2) (West 1964); MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 26.1109 (Callaghan 1984); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 504.18 (West 1983); NEV. REV. STAT. §
118A.290 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-A:14 (Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:42-88 (West
Supp. 1984-85); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-b (McKinney Supp. 1984-85); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-42
(1984); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-13.1 (1978); Onto Rev. CODE ANN. § 5321.04 (Baldwin 1983); R.I.
GEN. Laws § 34-18-16(1) (1984); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 43-32-13 (1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 59.18.060 (Supp. 1984.85); W. VA. CODE § 37-6-30 (1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 704.07 (West 1981 &
SUPP. 1984-85).
9' When rent controls are taken into account, one author has likened the current state of
residential rental property ownership to that of being regulated as a public utility. See Berger, supra
note 74, at 716-18, 731-33, 742-43. The investment potential and consideration for operating a
public utility are substantially different than for private investment in otherwise competitive or
quasi-competitive markets. Id.
See supra note 94 for a listing of states with statutes expressly recognizing the implied warranty
of habitability and states providing comprehensive statutory provisions that amount to the same type
of protection for the tenant.
97 See generally Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes,
Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093, 1093 - 1197 (1971); Komesar,
Return to Slumsville: A Critique of the Ackerman Analysis of Housing Code Enforcement and the Roar, 82 YALE
L.J. 1175 (1973); Ackerman, More on Slum Housing and Redistribution Policy: A Reply to Professor
Komesar, 82 YALE L.J. 1194 (1973); Heskin, The Warranty of Habitability Debate: A California Case Study,
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The landmark case on the implied warranty of habitability is favins v. First National
Realty Corporation." In javins, the United States Court of Appeals for the District. of
Columbia Circuit was presented with a landlord's action for possession based on a tenant's
failure to pay rent. 99
 Judge Skelly Wright, in evaluating the changing nature of residential
rental property ownership, decided that leases of urban dwelling units should be con-
strued like contracts for other goods and services.'"" Judge Wright concluded that. such
contracts should therefore include implied warranties of quality and fitness for the
ordinary purpose of habitation. un The District of Columbia housing code was the basis
for measuring the standards of the implied warranty that Judge Wright read into the
lease. 102
 The court held that a tenant could withhold rent on the basis of a landlord's
violation of the housing code, and could not be evicted for nonpayment." The court
accordingly gave the tenant. a defense against. the landlord's action for rent or possession
when the landlord breached the implied warranty of habitability.'"
•	 Other significant cases have followed the circuit court's reasoning in javins ,'"5
 The
California Supreme Court applied the javins reasoning while denouncing a landlord's
attempt to exculpate him or herself from noncompliance with the requirements of
habitability.'" The court held that such exculpatory clauses in a lease were invalid as
66 CAUP. L. REV. 37 (1978); Hirsch, Hirsch & Margolis, Regression Analysis of the Effects of Habitability
Laws Upon Rent: An Empirical Observation on the Ackerman-Komesar Debate, 63 CALIF. L. Rev. 1098
(1975); Meyers, The Covenant of Habitability and the American Law Institute, 27 STAN. L. REV. 879 (1975).
See also Brakel & McIntyre, The Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (URLTA) in Operation: Two
Reports, 1980 Am. B. FOUND. 555; Note, The Great Green Hope: The Implied Warranty of Habitability in
Practice, 28 STAN. L. REV. 729 (1976).
98
 javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925
(1970).
" 428 F.2d at 1073.
"" Id. at 1075; see also Rabin, supra note 54, at 549. In a letter to the author, Judge Wright
admitted that concern for racial turmoil and the disparity of wealth between black slum-house
tenants and white slum-house landlords played a factor in his landlord-tenant decisions. Id.
101 Javins, 428 F.2d at 1075.
102 Id. at 1081.
'"3 Id. at 1082. Judge Wright adopted the contract notion of dependent covenants allowing
tenants to avoid rental payments, since the apartment building was not in compliance with the
housing code. Id. at 1082-83. This approach is in contrast to the common-law rule of independent
covenants that would require the tenant to pay rent, even when the landlord was in breach of the
lease. Id.
1" Id. at 1082. See also Knight v. Hallsthammar, 29 Cal. 3d 46, 59, 623 P.2d 268, 276, 171 Cal.
Rptr. 707, 715 (1981); Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 199-202, 293 N.E.2d 831,
843-45 (1973); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 III. 2d 351, 366, 280 N.E.2d. 208, 217 (1972).
105 See, e.g., Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 623, 642, 517 P.2d 1168, 1172, 1184, 111
Cal. Rptr. 704, 708, 720 (1974); George Washington University v. Weintraub, 458 A.2d 43, 45-47
(D.C. 1983); Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass, 184, 195-99, 193 N.E.2d 831, 841-43
(1973); Park West Management Corp. v. Mitchell, 47 N.Y.2d 316, 324, 391 N.E.2d 1288, 1292, 418
N.Y.S.2d 310, 314 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 992 (1979); Kamarath v. Bennett, 568 S.W.2d 658,
660-61 (Tex. 1978); see also Mansur v. Eubanks, 401 So. 2d 1328, 1329-30 (Fla. 1981) (adopting
implied warranty of habitability); Pole Realty Co. v. Sorrells, 84 III. 2d 178, 182, 417 N.E.2d 1297,
1300 (1981) (deciding that implied warranty of habitability applies to single family homes, not just
apartment buildings, because tenants have same. reasonable expectations). Contra Blackwell v. Del
Bosco, 191 Cola. 344, 347-48, 558 P.2d 563, 565 (1976). The dissent in Blackwell argued the position
of javirs. Id. at 348-51, 558 P.2d at 566.67 (Pringle, C.J., dissenting).
'96 Henrioulle v. Marin Ventures, Inc., 20 Cal, 3d 512, 517-18, 573 P.2d 465, 468, 143 Cal. Rptr.
247, 250 (1978). See also Knight v. Hallsthammar, 29 Cal. 3d 46, 52, 623 P.2d 268, 271, 171 Cal. Rptr.
707, 710 (1981) (public policy and landlords' superior bargaining power preclude tenants' waiver of
warranty of habitability).
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against public policy.'" Two other courts have applied the Javins reasoning to hold a
landlord responsible for breach of an implied warranty of habitability when non-
compliance was the result of third-party action or inaction.'" Breach of the implied
warranty of habitability has recently become more than a tenant defense to an action for
rem or possession; it can now form the basis for an affirmative action for damages against
a landlord.'"
The implied warranty of habitability has placed higher penalties on landlords for not
complying with government standards for rental housing. The implied warranty has
given tenants an affirmative claim for damages as well as a defense against landlords in
actions for rent or possession. This increased risk of liability affects the calculus of
profitability of investing in rental housing. Externally imposed standards for construc-
tion, operation, and repair of rental housing raise the cost of owning such housing. For
the marginally profitable landlord, who would otherwise rent below standard premises at
below market rates, these additional costs may cause divestment. Likewise, the tenant's
ability to raise defenses and affirmative claims for damages in the landlord's action for
rent or possession adds to the cost of owning rental housing by making negotiation and
litigation of disputes more complex and time-consuming. All of these cost factors need to
he considered when the law is used to establish an "acceptable" minimum standard of
habitability. The landlord's response, especially the marginally profitable landlord, to
unrealistic standards may be withdrawal from the rental housing market altogether. The
consequence of this withdrawal could be the dislocation of tenants from "substandard"
housing to no housing.
L " ? Henrioulle v. Marin Ventures, Inc., 20 Cal. 3d 512, 518.19, 573 P.2d 465, 468-69, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 247, 250-51 (1978). This case sets out t he six criteria used by the court to find exculpatory
clauses invalid as contrary to public policy. id. at 518, 573 P.2d at 468, 143 Cal. Rpm. at 250. The six
factors the court identified are: (1) the agreement concerns a business generally thought suitable for
public regulation; (2) the party seeking exculpation is engaged in performing a service of great
importance to the public; (3) the party holds itself out as willing to perform for any member of the
public; (4) the party seeking exculpation has superior bargaining power; (5) using superior bargain-
ing power a standardized contract of adhesion is used to obtain exculpation; and (6) the person or
, property of the purchaser comes under the control and risk of the party obtaining the exculpatory
clause. Id.
1 "" See Berman & Sons, Inc. v. Jefferson, 379 Mass. 196, 200-03, 396 N.E.2d 981, 984-85 (1979)
(under implied warranty of habitability, landlord is responsible for condition of rental unit, even if
defects are due to no fault of landlord); Park West Management Corp. v. Mitchell, 47 N.Y.2d 316,
326-30, 391 N.E.2d 1288, 1293-95, 418 N.Y.S.2d 310, 315-18, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 992 (1979)
(landlord has a nondelegable duty to maintain rental property in habitable condition and the fact
that a workers' strike prevented the removal of garbage from the premises does not excuse the
landlord).
109 See George Washington University v. Weintraub, 458 A.2d 43, 45-47 (D.C. 1983); Simon v.
Solomon, 385 Mass. 91, 96-98, 431 N.E.2d 556, 561-62 (1982) (a breach of the implied warranty by
the landlord results not only in an affirmative action for damages, but also can be the basis of an
action for emotional distress). But see Weinberg v. Hunter, 385 Mass. 390, 396-97, 432 N.E.2d 467,
471.72 (1982) (landlord not liable under consumer protection statute for the emotional distress of
the tenant when the premises become infested with rodents). See also Alexander v. United States
Dept of nous. & Urban Dev., 555 F.2d 166, 170-77 (7th Cir. 1977), aff'd, 441 U.S. 39 (1979). In
Alexander, the Seventh Circuit held that a federal housing project for low income families did not
carry an implied warranty of habitability even though:
[t]he project was infested with roaches and vermin; elevators were often inoperable;
security was poor; hot water and heat were inadequate or non-existent; the buildings
were often Hooded; lighting was poor in the narrow hallways which were often clut-
tered with garbage; plumbing was deficient; and some tenants had electrical problems.
Id. at 167-68.
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C. Additional Landlord and Tenant Regulations
Many states have provided additional guidelines beyond the implied warranty of
habitability for the regulation of the landlord and tenant relationship. These additional
requirements, like the requirements for habitability, are directed toward providing a
"better" rental housing environment while clarifying reasonable expectations of the
duties and rights of each party to the residential lease. The Uniform Residential Landlord
and Tenant Act (URLTA) illustrates the broad spectrum of these regulations.""
Other state and local regulations affecting the landlord and tenant relationship
involve: the tenant's right to criticize, organize for action against, or withhold rent from
the landlord; 111
 the tenant's right to offset rental payments or to apply rent directly to
repairs; "2
 the tenant's right to rescind the lease on the basis of the uninhabitability of the
premises or the landlord's failure to repair or comply with comprehensive statutory
provisions for upkeep of the premises; "3
 the tenant's right to have a receiver appointed to
collect all rents from an entire building until the landlord makes repairs;" 4
 prohibitions
on the landlord's ability to select tenants and the prevention of discrimination against
PLO For a listing of states that have adopted URLTA and citations to the statutes, see supra note
94. See generally Brewer v. Erwin, 287 Or. 435, 447-49, 600 P.2d 398, 408-10 (1979). The Oregon
version of URLTA allows for the recovery of noneconomic damages resulting from a violation of the
statute including recovery for physical and emotional distress. Id.
1 " See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. lit. 14, § 6001(4) (Supp. 1984.85); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. §
8-203.1(h) (1981); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 186, § 18 (West Supp. 1984-85); NEV. REV. STAT. §
I I8A.510(I)(c) (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-8-39 (1978); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 230 (McKinney
Supp. 1984
-85); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.02(A)(3) (Baldwin 1983):
See UNIV. RESIDENTIAL. LANDLORD TENANT AcT §§ 4.103(a), 4.104(a)(1), 7B U.L.A. at 481-83
(1978 & Supp. 1985); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1363 (1974); CAL. Civ. CODE § 1942 (West Supp.
1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47a-13 (West Supp. 1984); DEL. ConE ANN. tit. 25, § 5306 (1974);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83,56(10(b) (West Supp. 1983); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 521-64(b)(1) (Supp. 1984);
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 383.635(1) (Bobbs-Merril! Supp. 1984); LA. CIV. ConE ANN. Art. 2694 (West
1952); Mc. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6026(2) (Supp. 1984-85); Mn. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. §
8-211(h)(2) (1981); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-a (McKinney Supp. 1984-85); N.D. CENT. ConE
47-16-13(1) (1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 121(B) (West Supp. 1984-85); OR. REV. STAT. § 91.805
(Supp. 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 43-32 -9 (Supp. 1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.100
(Supp. 1984-85).
"5 See UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD TENANT ACT §§ 4.101, 4.107, 7B U.L.A. at 478, 488 (1978
& Supp. 1985); ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.160 (1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1361 (1974); CAL. CIV,
CODE § 1942 (West Supp. 1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47a-12 (West Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 25, § 5307 (Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.56 (West Supp.1984); IOWA CODE ANN. §
562A.21(1) (West 1979 & Supp. 1984-85); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2559(a) (1983); KY. REV. STAT. ANN,
§ 383.625(1) (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6002(3) (Supp. 1984-85);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-24-406(1)(a) (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76- 1425(1) (1976); NEV. REV. STAT. §
118A.350 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-8-29 (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-12 (1984); N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 47-16-17(1), 47-16-13(3) (1978 & Supp. 1983); OHIO Rev. CODE ANN. §§ 5321.02(B)(3),
5321.07(B)(3) (Baldwin 1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, §§ 121(A), 121(D) (West Supp. 1984-85);
OR. REV. STAT. § 91.800 (1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34.18-7 (1984); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§
43 -32 -9, 43-32-19 (1983); VA. CODE § 55-248.21 (Supp. 1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.090
(Supp, 1984-85).
t" Appointment of a receiver, of course, would leave the landlords with a severe cash flow
problem and might even make it economically impossible for the landlord to make needed repairs.
See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-I4(d) (West Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5904 (1974); MD.
REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 8-211(1)(3) (1981); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 111, § 127(H) (West 1983);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 566.25(1) (West 1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 441.590 (Vernon Supp. 1985); N.J.
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various classes of tenants; " s and increased landlord liability for injuries to tenants.""
The willingness of private parties to assist in the enforcement of these regulations is
us See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1317 (1974); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit, 14, § 6024 (Supp. .
1984-85); NIINN. STAT. ANN. § 504.265 (West 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-101 (West Supp.
1984-85); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 236 (McKinney Supp. 1984-85); Friedman, Comments on Edward H.
Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: Causes and Consequences, 69 CORNELL L. REV.
585, 589-91 (1984) (discussing the need to assure access to housing for all people, including families
with young children); Note, Real Property - Prospective Tenant Denied Housing Because of Adults-Only
Policy Has Cause of Action Under Fourteenth Amendment and Fair Housing Act - Halet v. Wend
Investment Co., 672 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1982), 23 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 965 (1983). See also Halet v.
Wend Instrument Co., 672 F.2d 1305, 1311 (9th Cir. 1983) (the failure of landlords to lease to people
with children could be a violation of the Federal Fair Housing Act); O'Connor v. Village Green
Owners Ass'n, 33 Cal. 3d 790, 794-97, 662 P.2d 427, 429-31, 191 Cal, Rptr. 320, 322-24 (1983)
(applying the California Civil Rights Acts to units in a condominium project); Marina Point, Ltd. v.
Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 736-45, 640 P.2d 115, 124-29, 180 Cal. Rptr, 496, 506-11 (1982). In Marina
Point, a private landlord was held to have violated California's Unruh Civil Rights Act by excluding
children from rental units, despite evidence that children on the premises added to wear and tear
and to maintenance costs. The court's decision in Marina Point seems motivated by a concern
regarding the exclusion of children from sixty to eighty percent of the available housing, and the fear
that this exclusion would create an undue hardship on young families. 30 Cal. 3d at 729, 640 P.2d at
119, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 501. See also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 496-506
(1977) (The Court invalidated a city ordinance that defined "family" and restricted the ability of
some blood relatives from sharing the same housing units); Bynes v. Toll, 512 F.2d 252, 257-58 (2d
Cir. 1975) (university making housing available to married couples had no obligation to provide such
housing to couples with children); Yorkshire House Assoc. v. Lulkin, 114 Misc. 2d 40, 44, 450
N.Y.S.2d 962, 966 (Civ. Ct. 1982) (a landlord cannot refuse to rent to a couple merely because they
are unmarried); Stewart, Landlords' Verdict: Lawyers as Tenants Have Little Appeal, Wall St. J., Jan. 23,
1984, at I, col. 4, continued at 18, col. 3. Contra Kramarsky v. Stahl Management, 92 Misc. 2d 1030,
1032, 401 N.Y.S.2d 943, 944-45 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (landlords can refuse to rent to attorneys because
they are more troublesome tenants). See generally Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. I, 2-10
(1974) (village allowed to define the term "family" narrowly, and thereby restrict the number of
unrelated individuals permitted to live in a single housing unit); Hudson View Properties v. Weiss, 59
N.Y.2d 733, 735, 450 N.E.2d 234, 235, 463 N.Y.S.2d 428, 429 (1983) (landlord can evict tenant for
allowing a boyfriend to reside in the apartment).
See Browder, The Taming of a Duty - The Tort Liability of Landlords, 81 MICH. L. REV. 99
(1982); see also Cain v. Vontz, 703 F.2d 1279, 1282 (11th Cir. 1983) (an exculpatory clause favoring
the landlord in the lease is not effective to relieve the landlord of liability); Kline v. 1500 Massachu-
setts Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 486-87 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (a landmark case holding that
landlords are responsible to take reasonable steps to protect tenants from foreseeable third party
criminal acts); Kendall v. Gore Properties, Inc., 236 F.2d 673, 679-81 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (landlords
must exercise reasonable care in employing workers who will not be dangerous to tenants); Graham
v. M & J Corp., 424 A.2d 105, 105-06, 108 (D.C. 1980) (landlord liable for third party crime against a
tenant because the crime was made possible due to the failure of the landlord to take reasonable
precautions to protect the tenant); Spar v. Obwoya, 369 A.2d 173, 179-80 (D.C. 1977) (tenant
recovered $75,000 from his landlord for injuries received when shot by a third party in the hallway
of apartment building); Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. 160, 165, 359 A,2d 548, 552 (1976) (a landlord is
obligated to use reasonable diligence and ordinary care to keep common areas of buildings in safe
condition); Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 396-400, 308 A.2d 528, 533-35 (1973) (the court abandons
the common-law rule of caveat lessee, and imposes upon landlords a duty of reasonable care for the
safety of their tenants); Trentacost v. Brussel, 82 N.J. 214, 225-28, 412 A,2d 436, 441-43 (1980) (a
landlord's duty to make a rental unit habitable includes a minimum level of security for the
protection of the tenants); Braitman v. Overlook Terrace Corp., 68 N.J. 368, 382, 346 A.2d 76, 84
(1975). But see Phillips v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 89 Ill. 2d 122, 129, 431 N.E.2d 1038, 1041 (1982);
Pippin v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 78 Ill. 2d 204, 208-09, 399 N.E.2d 596, 598-99 (1979) (both cases
holding that a governmental housing authority has no duty to provide for the personal safety of
tenants against third party criminal acts unless the housing authority has undertaken such a duty).
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of particular importance to their success.'" Tenants need confidence to be able to report.
housing violations without fear of retaliatory responses from the landlord."' Tenants
may use an allegation of retaliatory eviction as a defense in a suit by the landlord for
possession of the premises or in a summary proceeding."' The importance of protecting
tenants from landlord retaliation has lead many states to adopt anti-eviction statutes or
prohibitions against retaliatory eviction,'"
Although this protection from retaliatory eviction seems reasonable, it is not without.
it.s impact on the supply and affordability of rental housing. In Robinson v. Diamond
Housing Corporation,' the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Skelly Wright, concluded that the tenant had a right to
withhold rent as long as the premises were below housing code standards. The court
further held that the landlord could not evict the tenant, even if' the landlord would
immediately take the unit off the market or was otherwise unable to pay the cost to bring
" 7 See Bowles v. Blue Lake Dev. Corp., 504 F.2d 1094, 1096-97 (5th Cir. 1974); Robinson v.
Diamond Hous. Corp., 463 F.2d 853, 858, 861, 870-71 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Judge Skelly Wright);
Golphin v. Park Monroe Assoc,. 353 A.2(1 314 (D.C. 1976); Edwards v. Habib, 227 A.2d 388 (D.C.
1967), rev'd and rem'd, 397 F.2d 687, 700-01 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969)
(another decision of Judge Skelly Wright).
" 8 See Bowles v. Blue Lake Dev. Corp., 504 F.2d 1094, 1096-97 (5th Cir. 1974); Robinson v.
Diamond Hous. Corp., 463 F.2d 853, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Judge Skelly Wright); Golphin v. Park
Monroe Assoc., 353 A.2d 314, 317 (D.C. 1976); Edwards v. Habib, 227 A.2d 388 (D.C. 1967), rev'd
and rem'd, 397 F.2d 687, 700-01 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969) (another decision
of Judge Skelly Wright). See also Vargas v. Municipal Court of Riverside County, 22 Cal. 3d 902,
914-17, 587 P.2c1 714, 722-23, 150 Cal. Rptr. 918, 925-27 (1978) (tenant farm workers raised defense
of retaliatory eviction against employer-landlord after a labor dispute arose); S.P. Growers Ass'n v.
Rodriguez, 17 Cal. 3d 719, 724-28, 552 P.2d 721, 723-28, 131 Cal. Rptr. 761, 763 -68 (1976) (involved
an eviction'action against tenant farm workers by landlord -agricultural employer in retaliation for
the farm workers having filed a suit under the Federal Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act).
Contra Hurricane v. Kanover, Ltd., 651 P.2d 1218, 1220-23 (Colo. 1982) (tenant lost on the merits of
his contention that he was the victim of a retaliatory eviction due to his participation in a tenants
group).
"9 See, e.g., Barely v. Superior Court of Orange Count y, 30 Cal. 3d 244, 247 -51, 636 P.2d 582,
583-85, 178 Cal. Rptr. 618, 619-21 (1981); Clore v. Fredrnan, 59 III. 2d 20, 26-27, 319 N.E.2d 18,
21-22 (1974). Under Illinois law, the tenant not only has a defense to a landlord's eviction action, but
the tenant can also pay rent into a court escrow account during the dispute so that the landlord is
unable to have access to this income until the matter is resolved. Id. See generally Comment, Landlord
Eviction Remedies Act — Legislative Overreaction to Landlord Self-Help, 18 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 25 (1982)
(discussing landlord eviction actions).
"2" ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.310 (1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-138! (1974); CAL. CD.. CODE §
1492.5 (West Supp. 1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47a-20 (West 1978 & Supp. 1985); DEL. CODE
ANN. tlt.. 25, § 5516 (1974); HAWAII Rev. STAT. § 521-74 (1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch . 80, § 71
(Smith-Hurd 1966 & Supp. 1984 - 85); IOWA CODE ANN. § 562A.36 (West 1979 & 1984-85); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 58-2572 (1983); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 383.705 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1984); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. Ht. 14, § 6001(3) (Supp. 1984-85); Mn. REAL PisoP. CODE. ANN. §§ 8-208.11, 8.206 (1981);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 186, § 18 (West Supp. 1984-85); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 27A.5720
(1983-84); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 566.03(2) (West 1983); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-24-931 (1983); NEB.
Rev. STAT. § 76.1439 (1976); NEV. REV. STAT. § 118A.510 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN, §540:13-a,
540:13-d(s) (Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:42-10.10 (West 1984-85); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
47.8-39 (1978); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 223-b (McKinney Supp. 1983-84); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-37.1
(1984); 01110 REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.02 (Baldwin 1983); OR. Rev. STAT. § 91.865 (1983); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 66-28-514 (1982); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN § 92.057 (Vernon 1984); VA. CODE § 55-248.39
(Supp. 1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.240 (Supp. 1984-85); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 704.45 (West
Supp. 1984-85). See also D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 45-1561, 45-1562, 45-1561.1 (1981 & Supp. 1984).
Robinson v. Diamond Hous. Corp., 463 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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the unit up to code requirements. 122 The court of appeals stated that nonpayment of rent
was not a legitimate purpose for removing the tenant from possession and that the
landlord would never be able to evict the tenant. so  long as the landlord was motivated by a
desire to rid him or herself of a tenant who was not paying rent. 123
The result of Robinson seems to be that the tenant, once in possession of a below-
standard apartment, is able to stay in possession without paying rent. and that the landlord
cannot evict the tenant or take the unit off t he market. Such a policy does more than
protect a tenant's right to enforce landlord and tenant regulations. It raises the spectre
that a landlord may be forced to maintain an unprofitable investment and even put
additional capital into it. This inability to divest of a had rental housing investment
reduces liquidity and discourages initial investment into this sector of the housing market.
Given adequate returns on investment and the prospects of unhindered liquidity,
most landlords should be willing to comply with reasonable standards of construction,
operation, and repair of rental housing. Yet maintenance of these standards is accom-
panied by a cost, and landlords need the freedom to adjust rents upward to cover the costs
of complying with the standards. Restrictive rent controls cannot be imposed with the
expectation of attracting investment into rental housing, if compliance with rigorous
standards and regulations governing landlord and tenant relationships is to be main-
tained. 124 As long as the rental housing market remains reasonably competitive, rents will
reflect the reasonable cost of regulatory compliance plus a market rate of return at least
equal to what. an investor would expect from an alternative investment of comparable
risk.
Society, through the legislative process, cannot correct long-term rental housing
problems by coercing compliance on landlords, while at the same time removing all
financial incentives to participate in the market. The end result of such a strategy can only
be creation of disincentives for investment in residential rental property, resulting in a
prolonged rental housing shortage and continuous attempts by marginal landlords to
undercut the standards the regulations impose.
D. Regulation of Conversions To Ownership Form
One of the results of excessive regulation of the landlord and tenant relationship
combined with stringent rent regulation is the rush by landlords to divest through
conversion of their residential rental property to ownership forni. 125 In an attempt to
keep landlords in the rental housing market, some states have adopted anti-conversion
laws, or restrictions that require tenant approval or participation for a conversion to
condominium or cooperative ownership form.' 26
The general justifications of anti-conversion legislation are protection of tenant
rights, 12/ maintenance of or improvement to local rental stock, 128 and a concern that
' 2' Id. at 865-67.
12' Id. at 865.
124 See generally 7,4(m 	 iRIEDMAN, BRIGHT PROMISES, DISMAL PERFORMANCES 105-07 (1983).
121 See REPORT, supra note 1, at 92.
128 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1326 (Supp. 1984-85); Cow. REV. STAT. § 38.33-112 (1973);
N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:18-61.8 to - 61.39 (Supp. 1984-85); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 352-eee, 352-eeee
(McKinney Supp. 1984-85); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-36-37 (1984). See also D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 45-1571,
45-1581 to -1585, 45-1601 to -1657 (1981 & Supp. 1984). See generally Note, The Validity of Ordinances
Limiting Condominium Conversion, 78 MICH. L. REV. 124 (1979).
127 See Zussman v. Rent Control Bd. of Brookline, 367 Mass. 561, 326 N.F..2d 876 (1975)
(court, concerned about disrupting tenants by the conversion plans of landlord, stated that a
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conversions are merely alternative means of charging excessive fees for shelter.'" The
operation of many of these anti-conversion regulations can involve requiring landlords to
establish a tenant relocation program or pay tenants relocation costs,'" giving tenants
notice and a right of first refusal to purchase the converted units,''' allowing tenants to
remain in possession of their unit after conversion, 32 and preventing rent increases
during the tenants' continued possession after a conversion to prevent de facto elimina-
tion of the tenants right to continued possession. 133
Tray Ltd. v. Renna 134 illustrates the problems of anti-conversion regulations. Plaintiff's
in Troy Ltd were owners of interests in an apartment complex in Springfield, New
Jersey that they sought to convert to a condominium. °" The apartment complex came
within comprehensive state legislation governing rental housing. 137 State law required a
three year notice to all tenants,m which amounted to a three year right of possession by
the tenants as a result of conversion. 133 The state statutes provided for an extension of
possession up to five years beyond the three year period so that, in practice, if a landlord
could not suitably relocate a tenant, the tenant could get extended rights of possession up
to a total of eight years.' 4° In addition, state law gave senior citizens and disabled persons
special protection that allowed extended periods of possession of up to forty years. 141 The
statute controlled rents during the extended possession periods for all tenants, and
provided that a landlord's costs of conversion could not be taken into account in figuring
the permissible rent level.'" Alleging that this state law constituted an unconstitutional
unit-by-unit conversion was not necessarily inconsistent with rent control, although the tenants were
able to hold up the landlord's project and run up the costs by posting only a $100 bond); Whalen v.
Lefkowitz, 36 N.Y.2d 75, 75-79, 324 N.E.2d 536, 537-38, 365 N.Y.S.2d 150, 151-54 (1975) (land-
lord's selling of units in apartment building will lead to gradual dilution of the tenant association's
strength and significance).
1 " See generally Bronstein v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 390 Mass. 701, 704-05, 459 N.E.2d 772,
775 (1984) (argument raised by tenants that anti-conversion laws in Massachusetts were designed to
enhance the housing stock and reduce disruptive effects of tenant relocation).
'" See Parkchester Apts. Co. v. Lefkowitz, 41 N.Y.2d 987, 988-89, 363 N.E.2d 712, 712-13, 395
N.Y.S.2d 162, 162-63 (1977) (jasen, J., dissenting).
130 See D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 45-1571, 45-1581 to -1585, 45-1601 to -1657 (1981 & Supp. 1984);
CHR General, Inc. v. City of Newton, 387 Mass. 351, 351-52, 439 N.E.2d 788, 789 (1982) (landlord
must obtain approval for tenant relocation plan to get local approval for condominium conversion).
13 ' See Columbia Plaza Tenants Ass'n, Inc. v. Antonelli, 462 A.2d 433, 437 (D.C. 1983); CHR
General, Inc. v. City of Newton, 387 Mass. 351, 351-52, 439 N.E.2d 788, 789 (1982).
133 See AMN, Inc. of New Jersey v. Township of South Brunswick Rent Leveling Board, 93 N.J.
518, 530, 461 A.2d 1138, 1144 (1983) (tenants are entitled to three year's notice before they can be
evicted for condominium conversion; senior citizens and disabled persons cannot be evicted for up to
forty years); CHR General, Inc. v. City of Newton, 387 Mass. 351, 352-53, 439 N.E.2d 788, 789
(1982) (tenant allowed to stay in possession after conversion, as of right for two years and possssion
can be extended to five years).
'" See CHR General, Inc. v. City of Newton, 387 Mass. 351, 353, 439 N.E.2d 788, 789 1982) (if
a landlord converts rental units to a condominium and then raises the rents to force the tenants out,
the rent increase will be unenforceable).
134
 Troy, Ltd. v. Renna, 727 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1984).




'' See id. at 289.
140 Id. at 289-90.
' 4 ' Id. at 291.
142 Id. at 292.
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impairment of their contract rights and a taking of their property without compensation,
the plaintiffs brought. an action against three tenants of the apartment complex, the State
Attorney General, and the Commissioner of the State Department of Community Af-
fitirs. 143 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the New
Jersey regulatory provisions did not constitute an impairment of contract or an unlawful
taking.'"
Under the New Jersey statutory scheme, the requirements involved in converting
rental housing to ownership form are prohibitively time-consuming and expensive. The
delay in removing non-purchasing tenants from the building requires an extended period
of time between the planning of conversion and its actual completion including sale of the
units by the landlord. This delay acids to financing cost, allows inflation over an extended
period to affect construction and labor costs adversely, and creates disincentives for unit
purchases because of the uncertainty of buyers regarding when the conversion will be
complete and the remaining tenancies terminated. 1 A 5 The extended period of protection
for senior citizens and the disabled may well extend beyond the useful life of the building.
In other words, a landlord converting a property from rental use might have certain units
under tenancy possession long after the building has ceased to be viable economically.'"
Anti-conversion legislation deters investment in conversions and may have different
effects from those intended by its proponents.. On the surface, the disincentives of
conversion seem to accomplish the goal of preventing a massive withdrawal of rental units
from the market, but in fact, the denial of an expected conversion profit can create
disincentives for initial investment in rental housing. The overall quality of the housing
stock as a whole suffers as well, because conversions generally require extensive updating
and improvement of the buildings converted. When conversions are not easily achieved,
the housing stock falls into disrepair at a faster rate than when profits could be obtained
from investment in their rejuvenation.
Even when local law does not expressly prohibit conversions, indirect regulations can
foster the same disincentives as anti-conversion legislation. Flynn v. City of Cambridge' 47
provides an example of indirect state anti-conversion regulations. Flynn involved a city
ordinance aimed at maintaining the supply of rental housing.'" While the ordinance did
not prohibit the conversion of rental housing into ownership form, it did prohibit use of
the property after conversion for purposes other than rental housing.'" The purchaser
of the converted unit, therefore, could only use it as a rental unit and could not personally
occupy it. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held the ordinance to be con-
"3 Id. at 293.
144 Id. at '297-303.
113 See generally Guenther, Investors in Occupied Co-ops Pin Hopes on Tenants Moving, Wall St. J.,
May 30, 1984, at 27, col. 1. The article points out the added risks associated with buying converted
units in which tenants reside and are covered by anti-conversion laws that protect their continued
possession. As a result of these risks, investors are putting more emphasis on the nature, age, and
health of a continuing tenant when determining the value of a unit.
146 See REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT AND THE LAW IN THE 1980s 64-73 (R. Levitt & A. Ntephe eds.
1983) (property that was depreciable over 30-40 years under the pre-1981 tax code, and property
that was depreciable over 15 years under the ACRS rules was placed under an 18 year depreciation
schedule under the Tax Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 111, 98 Stat. 631 (1984).
17 Flynn v. City of Cambridge, 383 Mass. 152, 418 N.E.2d 335 (1981).
L" Id. at 156-57, 418 N.E.2d at 337.
149
 Id. at 155-56, 418 N.E.2d at 337.
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stitutional, finding no taking because the owner was able to rent the converted unit and
under applicable rent regulations would get a "reasonable" return on his investment.""
Both Troy Ltd. and Flynn illustrate the complexity of legislative attempts to keep
landlords tied to investments in rental housing. These anti-conversion regulations are
"back door" attempts to force landlords to absorb the costs of a rental housing policy that
eliminates incentives for private investment and, at the same time, to maintain and
enhance the availability of affordable rental housing. Landlords' attempts to leave the
rental housing market. reflect their determination that selling housing units is more
profitable than continued ownership of rental units. In addition to reducing the expected
personal profit of rental property ownership, restrictions on conversion raise the cost of
leaving the rental market for tenants, and raise the cost. of home ownership for those who
wish to buy a converted unit. To the extent that investors are discouraged front entering
the rental housing market, tenants will have less rental housing stock from which to
choose, market shortages will be prolonged, and legislation will thus create additional
pressure for rents to rise.
E. Restrictive Land Use and Development Regulations
In addition to such regulations as rent control and restrictions on conversions of
rental property, other disincentives to the production of rental housing exist such as
restrictive land use and development regulations that can add to the cost of building new
housing."' First, these restrictions reduce the potential size of the rental housing stock
and perpetuate the upward pressure on rents. Second, by increasing the cost of new
construction, land use regulations tend to eliminate lower cost housing and raise the level
of rents necessary to make landlords' investments prolitable." 2 Some restrictions, such as
necessary open space or large minimum lot sizes, raise the cost of construction on a per
unit basis.' 33 Other restrictions, such as those that limit the number of bedrooms in rental
housing, seek to reduce, de facto, the financial burden on communities for local ser-
vices.',
The potential for restrictive land use regulations to raise the per unit cost of housing
is an important consideration in assessing the supply of affordable housing even though
such regulations may also serve a purpose of providing open space and a certain style of
living for those able to afford low density or high quality housing. A reduction in
unnecessary land use regulations and restrictions could significantly reduce the cost of
construction in the market for rental housing.' 55 With higher density allocations, rental
'" Id. at 159-60, 418 N.E.2d at 339-40.
' 5 ' See HOUSING SUPPLY & AFFORDABILITY, supra note 2, at 81-89; R. MONTGOMERY & D.R.
MARSHALL, HOUSING. POLICY FOR `DIE 1980s 113-25 (1980) (chapter by David E. Douvall discusses the
effects of land-use and environmental regulations on housing costs).
1 " See generally Lefcoe, The Public Housing Referendum Case, Zoning, and the Supreme Court, 59
CALIF. L. REV. 1384, 1429-30 (1971).
153
1" Id. at 1432-34.
'" See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mi. Laurel (Mt. Laurel II), 92 N.J.
158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983). See also Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481,
371 A.2d 1192 (1977); Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel (Ml. Laurel
I), 67 Nj. 161, 336 A.2d 713 (1975) (these two cases lay the foundation for the decision in Mount
Laurel II, and establish the principles of fair access and "inclusive 'coning law which seeks to include
people of all income groups within each community"); Rose, The Mount Laurel II Decision.' Is h Based
on Wishful Thinking?, 12 REAL EST. L.J. 115, 124 (1983) (the underlying assumption of the Mount
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housing projects could generate more profit on a per acre acquisition cost basis and add to
the incentives for investment. Added development costs due to excessive regulations and
restrictions are therefore as significant a factor in attracting new investment to the rental
housing market as are rent regulations, regulations governing the landlord and tenant
relationship, and regulations regarding conversions of rental units to ownership form.
I V. IMPLICATIONS
A. Conflict Between Federal and State Polity
National housing policy during the past forty years has been oriented towards
providing adequate shelter for all Americans.'''' Economic factors such as inflation and
high interest rates, however, have hampered the achievement of this purpose.'" Rental
housing has been particularly affected during the past 20 years because residential rents
have not kept pace with general prices, consumer income, or operating and construction
costs for rental units. 158 As a result, landlords are faced with a movement of high income
renters to home ownership and an increased difficulty in getting adequate rents from
lower income renters.'" Rent levels in general have been insufficient to sustain and
stimulate investment in residential rental property.'m To meet the nation's projected
needs for rental housing, changes are needed in the rental housing market. 161
Further achievement and maintenance of our national goal of providing an adequate
living environment for all Americans will require a coordinated federal and state effort. A
national policy in support of rental housing, a policy that. must respond to what some in
government have called a crisis in our nation's rental housing market, cannot be fully
effective as long as states and local communities can promulgate ;l vast. array of legislation
that creates disincentives for private investment in residential rental property.'"' Rent
Laurel decisions is the questionable assumption t hat it is economically Feasible to build new housing
for lower income people; if new housing is built, however, a trickle-down effect may help lower
income people); HOUSING SUPPLY AND AFFORDABILITY, supra note 2, at 199-201 (evaluating inclusio-
nary housing programs).
tss REPoicr, supra note 1, at 59.
' 57 Id,
'" Id. See also U.S. GEN. IV...cow:TING OFFICE, RENTAL HOUSING, supra note 16, at i-iii.
' 5° REPORT, supra note 1, at. 59.
ISO Id.
'I° Id. at 59-60. See also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RENTAL. HOLISING, supra note 16, at
29-30.
Our Nation's rental housing market has reached a crisis stage creating particularly
bleak prospects for lower income renters ....
Although the Government is subsidizing a significant number of rental units, the
need for additional assistance far exceeds the Government's present ability to provide it
The Congress and HUD are faced with quite a challenge — how to encourage
private investment in rental housing which is affordable to the nt,Oority of the renter
population. Without private involvement, our Nation will he farther away from achiev-
ing its 1949 goal of providing a home in a suitable living environment for all American
families within their financial means.
Id. at 29.
i" See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RENTAL HOUSING, SUPra note 16, at 29. See also U.S. Home
Ownership Declines, Wall St. J., Apr. 2, 1984, at 1, cot. S. The share of households owning their own
homes dropped to 64.6 percent in 1983 from 65.6 percent in 1980. Analysts have cited housing costs
as the major factor in this decline. A 1 percent decline represents over half the gain made in home
ownership during the 1970s. Id.
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controls and other state and local regulations, although responsive to large numbers of
voting tenants, are not responsive to the need to stimulate private investment in residen-
tial rental property. As a result, current tenants benefit from below market level rents,
while future tenants suffer from the resulting shortfall in supply. Consequently, state and
local legislation is often in direct conflict with the national needs for maintaining and
improving the rental housing stock.
B. Non-Local Impact of Local Rental Housing Policy
Under our federal system, states retain the power to regulate many aspects of the
rental housing market. 163
 Some states have also enabled local communities to exercise a
portion of this legislative power with respect to rental housing.'" Because the sources of
rental housing regulation are diverse, multiple policies are at play.'" This multiplicity of
policies regarding rental housing works against a coherent national policy.
The primary focus of state and local regulation is the balancing of the rights and
interests of landlords and tenants. In the process, such regulations also strike a balance
between renters and homeowners, at least by implication. The impact of rental housing
regulations on invest ment by potential landlords will have at least secondary effects on
home ownership as people compare the costs, comforts, and availability of rental housing
to the alternative of home ownership. Regardless of how these balances are struck, strong
political and popular support appears to exist for allowing the decision to be made and
implemented at the state and local levels.
Although state and local decisionmaking in the rental housing market may appeal to
the "homespun" American ideals of direct participation in government, it has a markedly
negative effect from a national perspective. The decision, for example, by New York City
voters and legislators to protect current tenants from "unfair" rents means that, to the
extent it creates a disincentive for investment and reduces the supply of rental housing
stock, tenants who might otherwise live within New York City will have to live in New
Jersey, Connecticut, or elsewhere in New York State. Rent control in one area not only
affects where people live, but also creates a need for additional highway facilities for
commuting and, therefore, adds to traffic noise and air pollution on an intercommunity
and interstate basis. The local decision to regulate rents, then, affects surrounding
communities and states.
More significant and less obvious is the way people from other communities and
states are required indirectly to subsidize policy decisions made by local communities
elsewhere for the benefit of their own residents. Federal revenue sharing programs,
urban and state grant programs, and tax incentives make such subsidies possible.' 66 State
and local governments know that the federal government will make funds available to
163 See supra notes 52-155 and accompanying text for a discussion of state policy and regulations
on rental housing.
164 See supra notes 52-124 and accompanying text for a discussion of rent control and building
codes implemented at local level.
165 See supra notes 60, 94, 96, 109, 110, 111-15.
166 See M. FRIEDMAN & R. FRIEDMAN, supra note 14, at 109-12 (rather than help the people
needing homes, most subsidy programs have really only benefited the landowners, builders, and
sellers); Olsen, Housing Program and the Forgotten Taxpayer, 66 THE PUBIJC INTEREST 97, 102-08
(1982) (a short history of United States housing policy) [hereinafter cited as Olsen]. See also REPORT,
supra note 1, at 27-48, for a discussion of the Community Development Block Grant Program and
public housing assistance.
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alleviate their "rental housing crisis," rejuvenate their dilapidated rental housing stock, or
create tax incentives to offset local disincentives to invest in residential rental property.
New York City, for example, can impose rent controls, enact overly restrictive zoning,
prevent conversions, and otherwise establish disincentives for investing in rental housing,
while offsetting many of the adverse consequences to the availability of rental housing
through federal intervention.
The federal government has two basic ways of generating funds to assist state and
local governments with housing problems.'" It can either raise revenue through taxes or
it can increase the money supply. 168 Through taxes, revenues raised from the entire
national populace can be redirected to any given local market. In this manner all tax-
payers pay for tax incentives provided for investors in residential rental property. To the
extent that a state or local government can shift these incentives away from federally
targeted recipients through regulation, federal policy is frustrated and localities are
allocating tax-based funds. This shift of incentives can occur when state and local regula-
tions are of the type discussed in this article that cause disincentives for investment in
residential rental property, which can be counter-productive to federal tax incentives to
encourage such investment. Through revenue sharing programs too, the federal gov-
ernment can shift tax revenues from one state to another. This method in effect causes
one state to subsidize the rental housing policy of another.
State and local decisions on rental housing policy, therefore, are of national interest
and have a national impact. Under the current system of federal intervention, residents of
states without restrictive rental housing regulations subsidize restrictive anti-investment
policies in other communities and states. In many cases, the policies they are subsidizing
indirectly may be the same policies considered and rejected directly by their own legis-
lators or by Congress. In effect, local regulation is being used to reallocate federal
revenues among the states. While this situation has the political advantage of giving more
power to the states, it makes the implementation of the national policy favoring provision
of adequate and affordable housing for all citizens difficult and endangers the mainte-
nance of an adequate supply of rental housing.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The need for a coherent national housing policy requires action to correct current
market misallocations and inefficiencies. These misallocations and inefficiencies are the
product of conflicting federal, state, and local housing policies. To correct this situation
this article recommends three major areas of change: (I) the coordination of a national
policy on rental housing through a system of federally legislated incentives and disincen-
tives; (2) the creation of a voucher system of subsidies for moderate income tenants; and
(3) the reformation of portions of the federal tax code affecting investment in housing.
' 67 M. FRIEDMAN & R. FRIEDMAN, supra note 14, at 253-70. In addition to raising taxes or printing
money, the government can also enter the financial marketsto borrow from the public. In so doing, it
must offer interest payments to investors that must be included as part of the national debt. This
increased interest puts additional pressure on the government to attempt to offset the debt by
increasing taxes or printing money. Id.
"1' Id.
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A. Federal Coordination of Rental Housing Policy
The nation's rental housing stock is currently in a state of crisis.'" 9 This condition
cannot be corrected so long as our national problems stem from divergent regional and
local policies, and the indirect effects of these policies transcend their arbitrary geopoliti-
cal boundaries. The federal government must take the lead in formulating and imple-
menting a national policy on rental housing that will solve this problem by coordinating
local decisions with macroeconomic effects. A solution will not be possible, however, so
long as the federal role is limited to passive intervention and subsidies.
To ensure proper political and fiscal responsibility at the state and local level, the
federal government. should not provide unlimited cross-subsidies and local housing
"crisis" bailouts. State and local decisions, in a world of limited resources, must be made
and priorities established on the basis of a reasoned evaluation of housing policies as they
affect private investment in rental housing, free of unlimited federal assistance. These
decisions should consider not only short-term benefits to renters, but also the long-term
need to maintain an adequate supply of rental housing stock. This approach would
require state and local authorities to evaluate the alleged benefits of all housing regula-
tions in light of the actual unsubsidized cost of programs in both the short-term and
long-term. In the absence of an outright prohibition on state and local regulation of rental
housing the decision process should at least. internalize the true cost of local regulatory
actions. In this manner, stale and local authorities could still implement regulations
inconsistent with the national goals, if deemed essential to local needs, but would do so on
the basis of an economically rational decision process, with the full cost of such regulation
being borne by the local community to be benefited.
Equally important is the need to recognize that. local solutions cannot. be fashioned at.
the expense of national difficulties. The decision to subsidize renters indirectly at the
expense of landlords and the creation of incentives for divestment of rental housing by
landlords is nationally unacceptable. Housing is not simply a local concern, but. a national
priority 170
Federal coordination of national housing policy should seek, through legal and
economic incentives and disincentives, to make state and local policy consistent with
national needs and objectives. This system of incentives and disincentives can be analo-
gous to the approach used in implementing a maximum highway speed limit of 55 miles
per hour, and in encouraging a national minimum drinking age of 21 years. 171 A system
of this kind recognizes that federal funds are limited and in the area of rental housing,
resources used to subsidize construction, create tax incentives, or issue local grants should
be apportioned to reward stale and local governments that cooperate in furthering
national policies on rental housing. This approach would, in the long run, ensure an
adequate and affordable supply of rental housing. Federal coordination requires only that
the federal government disburse direct and indirect housing assistance to state and local
authorities in accordance with their compliance with national rental housing objectives.
The federal government could reduce or eliminate federal grants, revenue sharing, and
financial assistance to localities that impose regulations such as rent control, anti-
1" U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RENTAL HOUSING, supra note 16, at 29.
I"
 National Hons. Act of 1937, ch. 121, 50 Slat, 70, 70-71 (1937) (current version at 12 U.S.C. §
1703 (1982)).
17 ' 23 U.S.C. § 159 (1982) (55 miles per hour provisions); 23 U.S.C. § 158 (1984) (21 year old
drinking age provisions).
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conversion provisions, and overly restrictive landlord and tenant and land use regula-
tions.
Scarce federal resources are not effectively used where local regulations offset na-
tionally subsidized programs and incentives for construction and maintenance of rental
housing.'" Therefore, federal funds should be directed to those localities that provide a
complementary system of regulation that establishes a process for incentives for private
investment in rental housing rather than a specific agenda for special interest legislation
that hinders investment and requires federal subsidies just to maintain the status quo.
B. A Voucher System of Subsidies .
Emphasis on encouraging private investment in rental housing requires a willingness
to allow rents to rise. As rents are allowed to rise and regulation is streamlined, normal
market forces should attract new investment into residential rental property ownership. 173
Market. forces would bring about a far more efficient allocation of scarce resources within
the various segments of the housing market and would allow rental housing to he more
competitive with alternative investment opportunities. A rise in rents, however, will not he
without adverse effects on moderate income citizens who are caught between the inability
to afford home ownership and the increasing cost. of rental housing. Being above the "low
income" mark, these people do not. have access to the safety net of programs for
subsidized low-income housing projects. 174 To alleviate the hardship that may fall upon
this group of moderate income people, a system must be implemented to subsidize
individual needs for adequate affordable shelter in rental housing, without penalizing the
long-term supply of rental housing. Such a system should address individual needs,
rather than group needs. The form of subsidy should therefore he geared not towards
subsidized housing projects, but to individual assistance through modified cash vou-
chers. 37 '
A voucher system would be similar to the system used for food stamps; vouchers
would be distributed to qualified people for use towards the purchase of rental housing.
Because tax dollars would support the voucher subsidy, the cash outlay should not be
totally unrestricted. The voucher subsidy should be targeted, and redeemable for only
qualified rental housing. Qualified rental units could be identified on the basis of general
guidelines for structural soundness, lack of rent controls, nondiscriminatory rental prac-
tices, and other reasonable qualifications. As long as approval of rental housing for
participation in the voucher program were not arbitrarily restricted, multiple sources of
rental housing would be available to tenants. Within this general program, moderate
income tenants would have a choice of landlords and rental housing facilities. Competi-
' 72 See REPORT, supra note I, at 92-93.
'" A. DowNs, supra none 53, at 2-5 (rents and profitability need to be increased to attract capital
to the rental housing market).
'" For the purpose of this proposal, moderate-income people are those individuals just above
the cut-off for eligibility for low-income benefits — such as welfare or food stamps — up to the
median income level of $24,000. Basically, those earning sixty percent to 100 percent of the median
income of $24,000 ($14,400 to $24,000) should be considered moderate income people under our
proposal.
'" For a discussion of the application and benefits of a voucher system to improve educational
services see M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 87-107 (reissued 1982) [hereinafter cited as M.
FRIEDMAN]; M. FRIEDMAN & R. FRIEDMAN, supra note 14, at 158-75; F. HAYEK, 3 LAW, LEGISLATION
AND LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE 60-62 (1979).
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tion between landlords would continue to make terms, services, and facilities responsive
to reasonable tenant preferences.'"
In administering the voucher system, guidelines for qualification for the subsidy
would have to he developed) ." Income ranges should be established relative to the
average income in the local community. A possible range for "moderate" income might be
from 60 percent to 100 percent of the average household income in the community.
Within this range of qualified income a sliding scale subsidy could be established. Assum-
ing similar circumstances, a larger subsidy should go to the "lower" income people or to
families with more dependents.
The subsidy itself should he set at an amount sufficient to enable the recipient to rent
adequate housing and the subsidy should progressively diminish to zero at the top end of
the qualified income range. In establishing the incremental reduction in voucher subsidy,
the system should he less than a dollar-per-dollar setoff against a recipient's increases in
income to retain incentives for individuals to work for extra income.' Diminishing
marginal returns would then exist for income gains within the qualified range but at least
some incentives would be retained. In addition, a system would be established that is more
favorable than one that would provide a full subsidy or no subsidy based on an arbitrary
absolute dollar amount.
The voucher system is preferable to directly subsidized housing projects because it
preserves individual choice in selecting rental housing, while allowing numerous private
investor-landlords to compete for tenants. This system should provide for better service
and facilities than if one landlord were providing housing for the entire subsidized group.
In addition, the voucher system makes pluralistic housing more feasible, because sub-
sidized and unsubsidized people could live in the same apartment complex mud- ,as food
stamp recipients shop in the same grocery stores as nonrecipients.
A voucher system also ensures affordable housing without burdening landlords.
Current state and local regulatory efforts instead ensure the- affordability of rental
housing by forcing landlords to accept lower or nonexistent profits. These regulations
constitute, in effect, a tax on landlords for the benefit of tenants. As a tax, such regulation
encourages divestment. The voucher system, on the other hand, maintains the affordabil-
ity of rental housing without forcing landlords to subsidize renters. Instead, by drawing
voucher funds from the general tax revenues of the federal government, all taxpayers
bear the cost of the subsidy.
While a voucher system for housing has been proposed previously, it differs from the
current proposal. The former proposal benefited low-income and elderly families and
16 See HOUSING URBAN AMERICA 242-44 (J. Pynoos, R. Schafer, & C. Hartman eds. 1980) (a
competitive market will operate within a system using vouchers or certificates to subsidize rents).
177 See M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 175, at 190-95 (the negative income tax proposals of Milton
Friedman establish the proper method of providing aid to those in need of assistance while retaining
some of the incentives important for a responsive market system); M. FRIEDMAN & R. FRIEDMAN,
supra note 14, at 124-46 (more on the negative income tax methodology); Olsen, supra note 166, at
99-102 (discussing a method of giving tax subsidies to individuals in need of assistance). See also Pub.
L. No. 98-369 § 612, 98 Stat. 905 (1984) (Tax Act of 1984 provides for a tax offset voucher-like
system under provisions for mortgage credit certificates).
See generally M. FR aEDMAN,SUpra note 175, at190-95; M. FRIEDMAN 8[ R. FRIEDMAN,SUpra note
14, at 124-26. In both books, Friedman makes a similar argument in the context of a proposed
negative income tax. His argument seems readily applicable to the system for voucher subsidies
proposed here.
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served as a substitute for present forms of housing subsidy.I 79 In I he structure proposed
here, the voucher system is not a substitute fbr existing federal subsidy programs but a
complement to them. It is, however, a substitute for existing state and local housing
regulations.
Earlier experiences with voucher programs for low income tenants have had mixed
results, but in general they have demonstrated an ability to benefit national housing policy
goals.'" Under the current administration, the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) is again experimenting wit h  a voucher system for subsidizing low
income tenants."' The focus of this article, while advocating a voucher system, is not to
address low income housing problems that. have given rise to prior programs,'" but to
expand on present housing policy. The voucher system proposed here is designed to give
financial aid only to t hose moderate- or lower-middle-income people who, as a result of
change in rental housing regulations, are unable to afford either rental housing or home
ownership. Many of the people unable to enter the home-ownership market without the
federal tax subsidy provided through the home mortgage interest deduction should
nonetheless be able to afford rental housing and would therefore he ineligible for any
voucher subsidies.'" Likewise, to the degree that limited numbers of moderate- or
lower-middle-income people need a voucher subsidy, federal tax revenues generated by
the reduction or elimination of the currently projected 255.8 billion dollar subsidy for
home ownership for the fiscal years 1984-1989 could provide the funds for the subsidy."'
The extent of the federal tax subsidy for home ownership can he put into perspective
by looking at the number of voucher-subsidized housing units that could be built for a
179
 By focusing on moderate-income people, the authors are in no way rejecting the idea of a
voucher system for low-income renters or anyone else. To the contrary, a voucher system for
low-income people, in addition to moderate income people, may be a better alternative than most
current forms of subsidy. A voucher system is the best way to alleviate the hardship caused by rising
rents and an increased demand for rental housing — both of which can result from reduced state
regulation and reduced subsidies to homeowners. For comments on a recent Reagan administration
voucher plan for the poor, see J. Lubin, Shrinking Shelter-Declining Housing Aid Worsens the Struggle for
Many Poor People, Wall St. J., Aug. 31, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
18° Frieden and Walter, What Have We Learned From the Housing Allowance Experiment?, 50 M.I.T.
HARV. yr. CENTER FOR URB. STUD., Working Paper No. 62, at 2, 47 (1980).
The results certainly did not bear out the skeptics' fears of widespread inflation and
unavailability of housing. Contrary to their predictions, the hard-to-house were able to
and adequate housing through the allowance program or had already found reason-
able places earlier. Female-headed and welfare families especially were able to make
good use of housing allowances ....
Housing allowance proponents can lake satisfaction in the program's ability to
reach and help families with serious housing problems. The high turnout of welfare
families underlines the failure of existing transfer programs to provide adequately for
the necessities of life and suggests that housing payments fill an important gap in the
network of social assistance.
Id. at 47.
18 ' [1984 Current Developments] Hous. & DEV. REP. (BNA) 183.
182 See, B. Frieden & A. Walter, What Have We Learned From The Housing Allowance Experiment? 50
M.I.T. - HARV. JT. CENTER FOR URB. STUD., Working Paper No. 62 (1980); (1984 Current Develop-
ments] Hous. & DEV. Rep. (BNA) 183.
'83 18 LAND UsE DIGEST, January 15, 1985, at 3. The $255.8 billion federal tax subsidy to
homeownership consists of $185.3 billion for the home mortgage interest deduction and $70.55
billion for the state and local property tax deduction as projected for fiscal years 1984-89. Id.
184 Id.
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similar cost. Under the current. HUD voucher subsidy program for low-income housing,
HUD has budgeted 86.5 million dollars to cover 4,543 units." This amounts to an
estimated $19,040.28 per unit. Reallocation of the 255.8 billion dollar subsidy for home
ownership to the rental market would provide 13,434,676 units at the same per-unit
subsidy for the fiscal years 1984-1989 for moderate-income families. When considered in
this light, it seems that. a system of voucher subsidies can he put in place to assist people
facing financial hardship as a result of reducing or eliminating regulations that create
disincentives for investment in rental housing.
The implementation of a federally funded and administered voucher system for
moderate- or lower-middle-income families would keep the benefits of state and local
regulatory schemes intact, but would remove the serious difficulties inherent in such
schemes. A federal voucher system would create no disincentive to ownership of rent al
housing, and state and local governmental units could no longer subsidize their own
populations at the expense of others. In short., the voucher system would protect rental
housing, ensure its affordability, and maintain a nationally consistent housing policy.
C. Federal Tax Changes
There are problems, however, in funding a new federal subsidy to help moderate-in-
come families obtain affordable rental housing. A voucher system of housing assistance
payments for moderate-income households would be a relatively costly program, whose
costs would necessarily be borne by taxpayers.
The federal government could take two basic approaches. First, it could simply
choose to spread these costs among all taxpayers by enacting a general tax increase. The
difficulties with such a plan, however, are that it would be politically difficult to achieve
and would imply a preference for such a subsidy over all other subsidies taxpayers might
pay.'" To increase the overall subsidy to housing and to fund it through a general tax
increase would, inevitably, lead other interest. groups, such as industry and education, to
demand that new revenues be used for their favored activities, rather than for housing.
An alternative to a general tax increase, coupled with an implied decision to give a
greater subsidy to rental housing than currently exists is simply to leave unchanged or even
reduce the total value of the present subsidy in absolute dollar terms, but to shift priorities
and targets within the general subsidy provided for housing. To accomplish this change,
of course, would require that some part of the existing subsidy he eliminated or reduced.
A cogent argument can be made for increasing the subsidy for rental housing at the
expense of the subsidy for single family home ownership.'" While the dream of home
ownership has been an integral part of the American ideal for the last century, it is a
dream that cannot he realized in a world of increasing population and a growing scarcity
of resources. On efficiency and social policy grounds, the maintenance of a subsidy for
single-family home ownership is impractical. Under present law, low-income families
receive a direct. subsidy for rental housing, and higher-income families receive an indirect
tax subsidy through the deduction for mortgage interest for single-family home own-
ership. If this indirect interest subsidy were reduced or eliminated, some of those individ-
uals who currently can afford to own a home would be precluded from home ownership.
1 " [1984 Current Developments] Hous. & DEv. REF, . (BNA) 183.
th" The authors do not argue for such a preference.
1" See supra notes 13 - 19 and accompanying text.
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These people, therefore, would be forced to live in rental housing which, presumably,
they could afford without a subsidy. By reducing the indirect tax subsidy for home
ownership, however, funds would become available for subsidizing moderate income
families who, under the present system of subsidies, could not fully afford market level
rents. In effect, by reducing the subsidy to marginal income home owners, money could
be made available to aid marginal income renters. The subsidy "safety net" now provided
primarily to elderly and low-income families would be extended to protect moderate-
income families as well.
As past attempts at reduction of the mortgage interest. deduction have demonstrated,
this proposal will encounter serious political opposition. A careful review, however, could
justify it. The voucher proposal would entail no overall increase in housing subsidy funds.
On the contrary, it would be possible to lower the overall amount of the federal subsidy to
housing. Furthermore, although the shift from subsidizing home ownership to subsidiz-
ing rental housing would force into apartments some families that otherwise might be
able to purchase housing, the shift would give far greater housing opportunities to
families that now must either struggle to afford adequate rental housing or depend upon
artificially maintained rent levels through state controls. Most important, however, by
funding the proposed rental housing voucher system, this subsidy shift would make it
possible for the federal government to justify legislation designed to encourage states not
to enact or maintain burdensome regulations. Ultimately, the rental voucher system
would eliminate the need for such controls. Thus, although homeowners and potential
homeowners would be adversely affected, this result would be offset by the advantage to
renters.
Mechanically, this subsidy shift could be accomplished through legislative amend-
ments made to section 163 of the Internal Revenue Code. The type of amendment would
determine upon whom the burden of the reduced home ownership subsidy would fall.
The easiest amendment to effect and implement would be one that simply limited the
amount of deductible interest as expressed by a percentage of' total interest paid. Thus,
such an amendment would specify that only a stated percentage of interest paid for
financing a principal residence would be deductible.
This form of legislative change presents problems; it falls most harshly on lower-in-
come homeowners and does not reduce the deductibility of interest paid to maintain
second homes. Politically, therefore, it would seem to be necessary to add two other
provisions to this amendment. First., only interest paid on debt acquired to purchase a
principal residence should be deductible. Mortgage interest on second homes, therefore,
would he non-deductible. Second, a cap should be imposed on the total amount of
mortgage interest that can be deducted. This cap would be determined by reference to
the average cost of a single family residence and by the average cost of financing such a
house. interest paid over the cap would be non-deductible. Thus, the suggested amend-
ment that would he most equitable and would also raise sufficient revenues to fund
adequately the proposed rental voucher program would be one that capped deductible
interest, limited interest deductions for residential mortgages to mortgages on principal
residences, and reduced on a percentage basis the amount of such interest that would he
deductible overall.
VI.  CONCLUSION
American housing policy is currently in a state of disarray. Federal policies generally
support both rental and owner-occupied housing. The federal government now uses both
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direct and indirect subsidies to further these policies. At the same time, many state and
local governments have also enunciated a policy favoring the provision and maintenance
of adequate and affordable rental housing. Various state and local governments have
implemented these policies primarily through enactment of regulations concerning rent
level, zoning, habitability standards, and eviction controls. Unfortunately, these regula-
tions are tantamount to a tax upon potential and actual landlords and, therefore, create
disincentives to invest in multi-family rental housing. State and local regulations are
therefore in conflict with federal policies. Consequently, a host of problems arises.
An additional factor that contributes to the current state of American housing policy
is the emphasis the federal government has placed on owner-occupied housing since the
end of the second world war. Owner-occupied housing suffers from a number of serious
drawbacks. It is financially inefficient, encompassing both a tax shelter component and an
investment component, and it seems to lend itself to higher, more costly owner expecta-
tions as to amenities. Most Americans s;rnply cannot afford to own their own homes.
Furthermore, it is inappropriate for government to subsidize owner-occupied housing to
the degree that it currently does. While owning one's own home is part of the American
dream, dreams must occasionally be altered to conform with reality. In a world where the
total number of subsidy dollars is limited, government should not subsidize the invest-
ment component in owner-occupied housing, nor should it create incentives for in-
efficient tax shelters.
The proposals set forth in this article are realistic. While the proposals will undoubt-
edly give rise to political controversy if implemented, they are well-justified. First, enact-
ing federal legislation designed to eliminate or control state and local regulation of
housing is vital to the continued availability of residential rental housing. Only by
eliminating the disincentives to investment created by current regulations can federal
policies favoring an adequate stock of rental housing be assured throughout the United
States. Second, to ensure that this housing is affordable, and to replace the former state
and local regulations designed to achieve affordability, the federal government should
initiate a new voucher program, targeted at families of moderate means to help them
procure satisfactory rental housing at an acceptable price.
Unfortunately, such a voucher program will be costly. The authors believe that
additional federal subsidies to housing above the present level are politically unfeasible
and could be challenged on policy grounds. Too many other social needs compete for
taxes. Therefore, to fund the proposed new voucher program without increasing the
overall level of the federal housing subsidy, funds within the housing area will need to be
reallocated. The best way to accomplish this reallocation is to reduce the indirect tax
subsidy for home ownership and shunt the savings from this reduction to the proposed
voucher program. This reduction would not affect low- and moderate-income homeow-
ners. On the contrary, it would only affect households desiring to purchase either second
homes or homes costing above the median. This allocation would affect these households
only as to interest paid or funds used to purchase these excess assets. While this reduction
in the tax subsidy does create a disincentive to certain forms of home ownership, it also
creates a major subsidy program for much more needy families. On this basis, it is
justifiable.
If we lived in the best of all possible worlds, one of unlimited wealth and resources,
the proposals contained in this article would be unnecessary. Everyone could own his or
her own home. Unfortunately, we live in an imperfect world of scarce resources. Alloca-
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